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Abstract 
Chapter one presents a novel approach for analyzing spatially differentiated 
impacts of a variety of large, geographically anchored entertainment attractions, 
including professional sports venues, convention centers, destination retail, and mega-
events. Public investments in such projects are often justified based on the potential to 
stimulate economic growth. The literature, however, fails to substantiate the existence 
of net aggregate benefits which are typically evaluated at the MSA level. I extend the 
literature by developing a spatial panel estimation approach which considers differential 
impacts across geographic locations as well as industry types. I demonstrate the method 
by investigating the relocation of the National Basketball Association Seattle team 
(Supersonics) to Oklahoma City (OKC Thunder). The franchise impacts are measured 
in terms of establishment-level sales using a unique micro dataset, the National 
Establishment Times series (NETs). The results highlight spatially differentiated 
impacts across the metro area: the franchise relocation attracted retail sales to the 
downtown area of OKC but may have decreased sales outside of downtown. 
 
Chapter two designs and implements a field experiment in Norman, Oklahoma 
to analyze the effect of norm-based messages on residential water use. The analysis 
finds evidence that the conservation message and the peer comparison messages 
encourage water conservation.  The estimated response to receiving a social comparison 
message is a 5 to 8.7% reduction in monthly water consumption. I find notable 
heterogeneity in response to social messages. Customers who consume more water than 
the median water utility user respond more to social messages than those who use less 
xi 
than median.  The findings suggest that social messages can be a cost effective option 
for municipalities looking to reduce residential water use through non-pecuniary 
mechanisms. 
 
Chapter three investigates approaches for estimating water demand and 
responses to water rate changes. Water utility pricing generally involves different rates 
for different levels of consumption. Such block rate structures complicate demand 
estimation. I challenge the long standing implicit assumption that a city’s demand can 
be represented by a single city-wide (or region-wide) demand curve in the presence of 
rate block pricing schemes. We employ the longest and most detailed panel dataset of 
household level water consumption, weather records, and housing characteristics 
available in empirical studies. This allows us to estimate demand curves for separate 
user groups in an increasing block rate scheme. We analyze two water utility rate 
changes implemented in Norman, Oklahoma and find downward sloping demand 
curves in all but one case. I estimate price elasticity to be between -0.13 and -0.53. Our 





Chapter 1: Location, Location, Location: Estimating the Economic 
Impact of Sports Venues and Other Attractions 
This paper develops a generalizable approach for evaluating the economic 
impacts of entertainment attractions, including professional sports team, sporting 
venues, convention centers, destination retail, and mega-events. Proponents of public 
investment in such major attractions tout the potential stimulus effects.  Popular press 
outlets are peppered with claims of large economic impacts associated with major 
attractions. “Fans and national media often spend the weekend at the city [during all-
star weekend] and spur economic activity at surrounding restaurants, hotels, and other 
local business.”
1
 The impact of the 2014 NBA All-star game was estimated to be $106 
million by University of New Orleans’ Hospitality Research Center (nba.com).  The 
Major League Baseball (MLB) 2013 MLB All-Star game was expected to generate 
$191.5 million for New York City (Dicomo, 2012).  
Although such predictions are widely accepted to be factual, there is, in fact, a 
striking lack of analysis regarding their validity. Some economic development 
professionals argue that such predictions are widely over stated.  For example, David 
DuBois, president of the Fort Worth Convention & Visitors Bureau, the estimated 
impact of the 2010 NBA All-Star Game played at the Dallas Cowboys stadium was 
only in the tens of thousands of dollars falling well short of the multimillion dollar 
estimates.
2
 Notably, cities and proponents of public investments rarely provide for ex 
post analysis of economic impacts of major attractions. (Andreff, 2012) Furthermore, 








the empirical academic literature, which does investigate ex post impacts, often fails to 
substantiate the existence of net positive economic benefits of such investments.  
The academic research has notable limitations, especially for understanding 
nuanced impacts of attractions which are inherently location based. Most research 
applies conventional regression models to economic outcome measures aggregated to 
the metropolitan statistical area level (Propheter, 2012); an approach which precludes 
analysis of spatially differentiated impacts. The construction of a sports stadium, for 
instance, will impact the geographic area closest to the venue the most and more distant 
areas the least. Additionally, using aggregate measures obscures industry-specific 
impacts. Normal economic fluctuations in a metro area can mask even the largest 
possible stimuli, such as an NFL Super Bowl mega-event (Baade et al. 2008).  Typical 
aggregate measures such as total sales tax collections, or personal income, include 
variation in potentially hundreds of industries that are not connected with the attraction 
of interest. For example, a professional sports team is not likely to impact 
manufacturing, car sales, and many other industries in any meaningful way.  
I address these limitations in two important ways; (1) by analyzing impacts in an 
explicit spatial context; and (2) by employing establishment level data to focus on 
industries most likely to be affected by the attraction. Notably, the National 
Establishment Time series (NETs) data includes the exact location of establishments, 
yearly sales, and industry identifiers. To demonstrate my approach, I capitalize on a 
unique case study: the relocation of the National Basketball Association’s Seattle 
franchise to Oklahoma City (renamed the Thunder) in 2008. The Oklahoma City 




entertainment district (known as Bricktown). Such a central, downtown location is 
shared by many major urban attractions such as convention centers.  
My approach yields estimates of differential impacts across areas of the city 
rather than the net benefit of attracting the franchise. In particular I estimate impacts on 
sales for establishments that are located at various distances from the Thunder arena. As 
expected, the results reveal spatially differentiated impacts: with increased retail sales in 
the downtown area of Oklahoma City near the arena, but possibly decreased sales 
outside of downtown. Understanding and measuring spatially differentiated effects is 




Sports teams, sports stadiums, convention centers, and mega events, as well as 
many other large capital investments, are often associated with a large capital 
investment focused in a particular geographic location. Previous literature focuses on 
the aggregate effects and has only recently begun to emphasize the placed-based nature 
of such investments. Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000), Coates and Humphreys (2003), 
and Propheter (2012) provide good  surveys of   the literature on sports teams, stadiums, 
and mega events as growth engines for urban areas.  Table 1 summarizes articles which 
are most relevant for understanding spatial aspects of place-based projects and 
highlights the extensions which I make to the literature. I use establishment level sales 
data to execute a spatial analysis and find differential impacts across industries and 




Most papers find sports teams, stadiums and mega events to have negative 
impacts or fail to find significant effects on income, sales, or employment. Baade and 
Matheson (2001), Baade and Dye (1990), Baade et al (2008), and Coates and 
Humphreys (1999) all observe negative growth impacts. Some papers find mild positive 
or mixed impacts. Nelson (2001) reports positive impacts when stadiums are built in the 











 Coates and Humphreys (2002) find that playoff games are not associated with 
growth in income unless the city has a team that wins the Super Bowl. Coates and 
Humphreys (2003) find professional sports to have a positive effect on earnings per 
employee in the amusement and recreation industries but offsetting negative impact on 
earnings in other sectors. Harger et al. (2015) unearth mild positive impacts on 
employment for existing businesses near the team’s stadium but finds no effect on the 
formation of new establishments near the stadium. Propheter (2012) finds that, whereas 
basketball stadiums do not cause growth on average, some cities have seen growth from 
new stadiums. Propheter (2012) is the first paper to include the Oklahoma City Thunder 
in an analysis and observes that the Thunder had a positive impact on the Oklahoma 
City MSA per capita income. My results support his conclusion that basketball-only 
cities see positive growth impacts from the presence of an NBA franchise. In particular, 
my analysis of OKC shows that any potential positive impacts are concentrated near the 
game venue location. 
Most empirical research on sports team, stadium, and mega event impacts uses 
census data aggregated to the MSA level. Only one other paper brings micro data to 
bear on the question. Harger et al. (2015) uses the Dun and Bradstreet Marketplace data 
to investigate business formation in the presence of a newly established sports franchise 
at the Census track level.  
Nearly all previous work in the literature uses ordinary least squares analysis 
with dummy variables to represent the outcomes before and after a change be it the 
construction of a stadium, occurrence of an event, or relocation or creation of a team.  




series approaches, Coates and Humphreys (2003), who use a dynamic panel model, and 
Harger et al. (2015) who employ a difference in difference model.  
Baade and Dye (1990) are the first to examine the relationship between sports 
(both stadiums and teams) and local income. They find that sports teams and stadiums 
are linked to lower per capita incomes and argue that this finding is consistent with the 
type of economic development typically associated with sporting events and stadiums. 
Stadiums are commonly surrounded by low skill, low paying jobs such as food service 
and retail work. Baade et al. (2008) use county level sales data in Florida to examine the 
power of strikes, lockouts, expansions, stadium construction and mega events on local 
economies. They acknowledge the value of confining analysis to the areas physically 
located near the stadium or event. 
An important aspect of analyzing economic impacts is that spillover effects can 
vary with distance and type of economic activity from the epicenter of the project. 
There is a rising interest in addressing the spatial dimensions of major location based 
projects. Nelson (2001) and Harger et al. (2015) are pioneers in investigating spatial 
aspects of place-based projects. They make novel contributions and I build on their 
work with a more explicit spatial model. Nelson (2001) uses dummy variables with a 
large panel data set to determine the value of the location of the stadium. Nelson argues 
that the stadium’s location relative to the city’s central business district is important. 
Teams closer to the city’s core generate more net benefit to the city and the clustering of 
sports teams in a central business district leads to increased growth. According to 
Nelson, “the metropolitan statistical area’s share of regional wealth increases and that 




metropolitan area’s share of regional wealth. The Chesapeake arena, where the Thunder 
plays, resides within the downtown central business district of Oklahoma City. Nelson’s 
results would imply that the Thunder occupies one of the best possible situations for 
stimulating economic growth since the stadium is close to the city’s core and in the 
central business district.  
A major limitation of the literature is potential aggregation bias associated with 
using data aggregated to the county or higher level. Harger et al. (2015) recognize that 
no other papers in the literature use micro data. They examine business activity in 
nearby census tracts, limiting their sample to census tracts within 1, 3, and 5 miles of 
the sports facility. I build on Harger et al. by using micro-level data at the establishment 
level. Using establishment level sales data allows for analysis of differential impacts 
across industries and geographic locations.  Accordingly, my analysis provides insights 
regarding the spatial winners and losers associated with a new major attraction. 
 
History of NBA Franchises in Oklahoma City 
The relocation of an NBA franchise is an unusual event that offers a rare 
opportunity to advance empirical research. Since 2000 there have been five relocations 
and franchise startups. In 2001 the Vancouver Grizzlies moved to Memphis, Tennessee. 
In 2002 the Charlotte Hornets moved to New Orleans and was replaced by a new 
franchise, the Charlotte Bobcats, in 2004. The New Orleans Hornets, now the New 




seasons in Oklahoma City.
3
 Most recently, the Seattle SuperSonics moved to Oklahoma 
City and became the Thunder in 2008. (nba.com)  
In other major American sports there have only been three major relocations and 
expansions since 2000. The Houston Texans of the National Football League began 
play as an expansion team in 2002. In Major League Baseball the Montreal Expos 
relocated to Washington DC to become the Nationals in 2006. In 2011 the Atlanta 
Thrashers of the National Hockey League moved to Winnipeg, Canada and became the 
Jets. The National Football League approved the most important relocation in modern 
sports history by allowing the Saint Louis Rams and San Diego Chargers to move to 
Los Angeles for the 2016 and 2017 seasons, respectively.   
There are few opportunities to study relocations and even fewer in which a team 
moves to an area that does not already host another major sports franchise. Of the 
relocations and expansions since 2000, only the Thunder, Jets, and Grizzlies moved to 
cities that did not host other major professional teams. The other major relocations and 
expansions not only involved metropolitan areas with other major sports teams, they 
also involved stadiums located within a 10 minute drive of at least one other team’s 
stadium. Accordingly, unique aspects of relocations in the regional context are 
important for internal and external validation.  For example, a relocation that involves a 
new and solo major sports venue is likely to involve less cannibalization.  On the other 
hand, there would be less opportunity to cluster facilities and share parking and transit 
networks.  
                                                 
3




The Thunder moved to OKC in 2008, two years after the NBA approved the sale 
of the SuperSonics to Oklahoma City businessman Clay Bennett for $350 million. The 
transaction was highly controversial in Seattle; fans citywide protested the sale and 
relocation to Oklahoma City. There are still periodic news stories about the perceived 
injustice surrounding the event (Booth, 2012). Meanwhile the people of Oklahoma have 
embraced the team and have provided one of the most enthusiastic fan bases in the 
NBA
4
. Although the zero sum game aspect of such a location is provocative, my focus 
is on the impact of the Thunder relocation on OKC.
5
 
The relocation of the NBA franchise could impact the OKC metropolitan area 
via direct spending impacts as well as indirect multiplier effects. The NBA franchise 
could directly increase local spending.  Some argue that one avenue of economic 
growth impacts players spending their salaries in the city provide one avenue for 
economic growth (Rapport and Wilkerson 2001). As the only major professional sports 
team in Oklahoma City, the Thunder provides a novel source of entertainment to the 
area, one which the city has embraced whole heartedly. The Thunder averaged 18,003 
in home attendance in 2010
6
, in an arena with a capacity of 18,203, good for 98.9%
7
. 
Their total attendance for 2010 was 738,149. The Thunder has ranked in the top 12 of 





demonstrates the strong demand for NBA entertainment in OKC.  





 A question for another paper would be comparing the magnitudes of the potential gain in OKC to the 










The net effect of Thunder-related spending depends on whether it was new 
spending or simply substituted for spending on other activities. Some businesses, such 
as; restaurants, bars, and retail establishments, are likely to directly benefit from the 
Thunder’s presence. Other businesses, however, might be negatively impacted. Both the 
nature of the activity and the location are relevant factors. The Thunder might stimulate 
sales in the OKC downtown area at the expense of sales that would have happened 
anyway. These sales could be cannibalized from other OKC venues or from elsewhere 
in the city. For example, individuals who intended to visit and shop in downtown OKC 
might choose to shop elsewhere, or not at all, when a Thunder game is being played. 
The Thunder-related traffic could discourage would be visitors and shoppers who are 
not interested in the game. Alternatively, an individual visiting downtown OKC might 
forgo other forms of entertainment to attend a Thunder game. These examples illustrate 
how the Thunder could generate sales but not cause a net increase in sales in the region 
as a whole.  
In order to assess the impact of the NBA franchise the counterfactual case must 
be considered. The literature focuses on estimating net growth impacts for the entire 
region. In contrast, I estimate impacts on sales activity as a function of distance from 
Chesapeake Energy Arena where the Thunder games are played. This spatial approach 
reveals the Thunder’s impacts on different regions of Oklahoma City.  
 
Empirical Specification 
The goal is to develop an empirical approach to identify differential spatial 




type impact. The economic outcome measure of interest is taxable sales at the 
establishment level.  As Baade, Baumann and Matheson (2008) argue, taxable sales are 
ideal for measuring economic impacts. In addition, taxable sales are superior to various 
measures of income because fluctuations in income independent of the impact of 
interest, more readily obscure impacts of interest.  
The estimation strategy involves a pooled ordinary least squares regression with 
a vector of distances and an interaction term between the distance vector and the 
treatment. Specifically, the basic econometric specification is as follows;  
(1) Yit=β0*D + β1*D*Treatment + β2*Neari+ β3*XC + γ + λ + ε. 
 Yit is individual establishment i’s annual taxable sales in year t, where t includes 
observations from 1990 to 2010, a period which includes years before and after the 
presence of the Thunder in OKC. The establishment level data are from the NETs 
database which is derived from Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) establishment data.  
Covering all of the private businesses, non-profit, and government establishments 
required to have D&B ratings, it is a near 100% coverage of establishments. The 
detailed individual establishment records include exact longitude and latitude, industry 
classification, and annual taxable sales data.  
 The necessary identifying variable is distance, defined as the Euclidian distance 
from an establishment to the venue of interest, the Chesapeake arena. D is a vector of 
Euclidian distances from the arena to the establishment. It includes linear distance, 
distance squared and distance cubed.  We know from previous literature that impacts of 
place-based projects are likely to be localized. We also know that impacts at greater 




Euclidian distance does not account for features of roads such as, cul de sacs, 
one way roads, dead ends, exits and turn arounds.  Notably, few road features result in 
more than a few hundred yards in difference of driving distance. Within a mile or two 
of the stadium, this difference could impact estimates but beyond that the difference 
between two miles and two miles plus two hundred yards would be unlikely to 
influence estimates. 
Treatment is a dummy variable equal to one for years the NBA treatment is in 
effect. The benchmark treatment effect is the presence of a hometown NBA franchise. It 
equals one for the years the Thunder played basketball in Oklahoma City. The Thunder 
played their first game in the 2008-2009 season. Other treatments specifications are also 
estimated as discussed below. 
Near, is a dummy variable equal to 1 when an establishment is within 500 
meters of the arena. The purpose is two-fold. First, it prevents the estimation from 
forcing the sales to be zero when distance is zero. Second, it allows for a differential 
estimation of those businesses within walking distance of the stadium (Dronyk-Trosper 
2015). 
XC is the vector of controls at the census tract level. The control variables, 
population density and income, come from the US Census Bureau. As discussed 
previously, other authors have argued that controls for income and employment are 
imperative. Baade and Dye (1990), and Propheter (2012), among others, use income 
and population at the MSA level. Of course, population density and employment are 
highly correlated at the census tract level. I present the estimates without employment 




Population density is the population in a census tract divided by the area of the 
census tract. This is a better control than simple population since a larger census tract 
with the same population as a smaller census tract has different sales potential. Census 
population and income are only collected and reported every ten years. To gain more 
variation and to more closely reflect actual population and income from year to year, 
the variables are linearly interpolated between 1990 and 2000 and again between 2000 
and 2010 using a simple average. 
The remaining variables capture fixed and time effects.  γ is a dummy variable 
for census tract in which the establishment is located. λ is a vector of year dummies. ε is 
the White’s standard error term, implemented to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 2 includes summary statistics of several samples used in my analysis. The 
benchmark specification limits the sample to industries that are potentially related to the 
NBA product. Retail stores, restaurants, and bars are expected to be compliments with 
the Thunder’s product, whereas businesses in the entertainment industry are almost 
certainly substitutes. The focus on related industries eliminates noise associated with 
non-treatment related variation in sales in unrelated activities. Approximately 20% of 
establishment in a given year are in related industries. When the model is estimated 
using the expanded sample, which includes all industries in the NETs database, the 
NBA relocation is not found to be significantly correlated with establishment sales at 
any distance from the Chesapeake Arena. 
Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics for the variables discussed above for 
the main sample which only includes to those industries likely to be impacted by the 




specification is applied to three different geographic sub-samples, establishments 
within; one mile, five miles, and ten miles of the stadium. Results are robust to the 
distance restrictions chosen; other limiting distances do not significantly change the 
impacts.  












The benchmark results are given in Tables 5 through 7.  The estimates suggest 
the relocation of the Oklahoma City Thunder is correlated with a positive impact near 
the arena. All of the coefficients of interest, the interaction terms, are highly statistically 
and economically significant. In the Hometown franchise specification, all of the 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of the treatment distance 
interaction at ten miles are not significant. Specifically, the coefficients on the distance-
treatment interaction terms indicate the impacts on estimated sales in years after the 
relocation of the Thunder at various distances from the Chesapeake Arena.   
The distance effect is best demonstrated with graphs since the direct 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients on distance is difficult to understand without 
a visual representation. Accordingly, Figures 1 through 3 plot the estimated sales for 
establishments located at various distances to the Chesapeake Arena prior to and after 
the relocation of the Thunder. The figures show that the Thunder potentially pull sales 
into the downtown area. Without the Thunder, sales fall quickly as firms are farther 
away from arena. With the Thunder the sales within a half mile increase dramatically 
and from a half mile to one mile the sales fall slowly.  
The results suggest that the Thunder affects the economy significantly in the 















Figure 3: Ten Miles 
 
 
Alternative Treatment: NBA Games and NBA Presence 
A potential concern is that the brief presence of the New Orleans Hornets in 
Oklahoma City after Hurricane Katrina might confound the effect of the Thunder NBA 
franchise. To address this I explore two additional specifications of treatment years, 




Table 4: Alternate Definitions of the Treatment Variables 
 
The NBA games specification defines the treatment as occurring in all the years 
from 2005 forward except 2007. This takes advantage of variation in the presence of an 
NBA franchise. The NBA games treatment is defined by actual playing of NBA 
basketball games in Oklahoma City. This begins with the Hornets’ relocation in 2005, 
stops after the Hornets’ leave and begins again when the Thunder arrives. The Hornets 
leave Oklahoma City in 2007 while the Thunder arrive in 2008, which means that 
although the City went most of a year without games being played, there is technically 
basketball being played in each year. 
The NBA Presence treatment begins with the Hornets’ temporary relocation to 
Oklahoma City in 2005 and continues through the end of the sample. Thus, the 
treatment dummy is equal to 1 for all years 2005 to 2010. This definition of the 
treatment represents the impact of drawing potential customers into the downtown area 
during game times. The Hometown treatment definition accounts for the “big league 
city” effect or the region’s ownership of the team and might be reflected in increased 
sales more by the purchase of the hometown team’s jerseys or of players spending their 
income locally. In contrast, the NBA games treatment focuses more on the attraction of 
potential customers into the physical area surrounding the arena, so far as annual data 




The results are incredibly similar across the different specifications of the 
treatment years. As shown in Tables 5 through 7, all of the treatment coefficients in the 
NBA presence and NBA games specifications are significant at least the 10% level, 
with most being significant at the 1% level.  
 
 















Alternative Treatment: One Mile Increments 
Given the positive coefficients near the arena and the weakening of the impacts 
further away from the arena an interesting question arises; what distance separates 
establishments that benefit from the Thunder from those that do not? Since the 
Thunder’s impact should be largest near the arena and smaller/negative further away 
from the arena, it is instructive to find the demarcation between potential winners and 
losers.  
I approach this issue by specifying non-inclusive one mile increments from the 
Chesapeake Arena. For instance, the one mile increment from five miles to six miles 
away from the stadium includes only those establishments located at least five miles 
from the stadium but no more than six miles from the stadium.  In this way, the distance 
vector can be simplified to a set of linear one-mile increment terms, which can capture 
non-uniform impacts across various distances.  This is similar to a Kernel estimator. By 




intervals, such as from 6 to 7 miles from the arena, rather than yielding impacts over 5 
and 10 mile intervals.  
The one mile increments will still include increasingly more establishments 
because the geographic area covered by an increment will increase as they move away 
from the arena. 
Recall from above that in the three specifications featuring the five mile 
restriction the linear distance and treatment interaction coefficients are significant, but 
none of the squared or cubed distance coefficients are significant. As shown in Table 8, 
both the first and second mile increments have large positive coefficients, which fit with 
the results shown in the benchmark method. Beyond these, only the sixth (from five 
miles to six miles away from the stadium) and ninth mile increments have coefficients 
which are positive and significant at the five percent level. The geographical 
distribution of establishments in Oklahoma City is important and are apparent in the 
maps shown in Appendix A. The fifth to sixth mile increment includes three important 
areas; one on the Northwest expressway which includes the largest shopping mall in the 
metro area, another east of the arena which includes a casino, zoo and shopping area, 
and the third is a large group of retail establishments south of the arena on the major 
loop around the city. The eight to nine mile increment includes fewer major shopping 
areas but one of the most important shopping and entertainment areas outside the 
downtown area in the city of Moore. This area is one of the highest concentrations of 
shopping and restaurant establishments outside of Oklahoma City proper.  
Taken together, an increase in sales for the one, two, six and nine mile 




shopping and restaurants all experienced growth coincidentally with the Thunder’s 
relocation. (Figure 4) 
An expectation based on previous literature would have been that establishments 
in industries the hometown franchise might impact which are located outside of the 
metro, like those in the sixth and ninth mile increments, would have suffered from the 
Thunder’s presence by virtue of the substitution effect. Although the results reveal 
positive and significant impacts in the mile by mile model for some intervals beyond 
five miles, estimated coefficients are negative but insignificant in the ten mile 
benchmark models. It could be, as authors like Nelson (2001) suggest, the lack of other 
major professional sports in the area causes this to be a best case scenario for the growth 
engine theory. Perhaps a new franchise can provide a novel source of entertainment at 
minimal cost to other entertainment establishments without the presence of competing 
sports franchises. However, the evidence presented here is certainly not conclusive on 
the matter.   
  Another possibility is that city-wide growth trend drives the results estimated 
above. A growth trend felt equally, or randomly distributed, across establishments 
within the metro area could mask the estimated the treatment-distance interaction effect. 
Notably, the treatment interaction term is insignificant when the sample is broadened to 
include the full scope of industries. Thus, for a growth trend to impact my estimates it 
would need to affect only those establishments in the entertainment and retail industries, 
not be absorbed by year or census tract fixed effects, and do so in manner that originates 




establishment sales. This growth trend would also have to be positive to explain the 
estimates, which is unlikely given the timing of the recession.  
 
Table 8: Mile by Mile 
 
One Mile Two Mile 
  Coefficient/SE Coefficient/SE 
Distance -2,019.4*** 276.5 -1,380.1*** 349.6 
Treatment Distance 937.5*** 278.9 1,084.3** 426.7 
Income -4.24 7.71 -12.625 8.307 
Density -481,600,000 634,800,000 -285,200,000 595,400,000 
Near -1,410,000*** 280,000 
  
CT FE x 
 
x 
 Year FE x   x   
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;   
     
 
Three Mile Four Mile 
  Coefficient/SE Coefficient/SE 
Distance -1,327.4*** 292.3 2,687.0*** 681.6 
Treatment Distance 300.8 436.9 2,512.80 2,112.00 
Income -12.014 15.281 -24.95 16.912 
Density 1,258,300,000*** 424,500,000 -789,100,000 795,800,000 
CT FE x 
 
x 
 Year FE x   x   







Five Mile Six Mile 
  Coefficient/SE Coefficient/SE 
Distance 224.4 205.5 63.6 153.5 
Treatment Distance 95 1,310.60 653.0** 310.9 
Income -4.294 6.708 -6.469 4.289 
Density 1,637,800,000* 902,900,000 3,510,000,000*** 921,000,000 
CT FE x 
 
x 
 Year FE x   x   
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
        
     
     
     




     
     
     
 
Seven Mile   Eight Mile   
  Coefficient/SE Coefficient/SE 
Distance -443.3*** 111.2 254.5*** 74.1 
Treatment Distance -281.7 199.4 255.9 163.8 
Income 2.649 3.487 27.374*** 8.151 
Density -795,800,000** 336,000,000 -366,200,000 367,100,000 
CT FE x 
 
x 
 Year FE x   x   
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
  
     
 
Nine Mile Ten Mile 
  Coefficient/SE Coefficient/SE 
Distance -338.1*** 70.8 -1,212.7*** 201.1 
Treatment Distance 348.8** 153.3 -135.5 489.2 




338,400,000 -457,600,000 639,800,000 
CT FE x 
 
x 
 Year FE x   x   
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 








This paper finds that the presence of the Oklahoma City Thunder corresponded 
with an increase in sales within a one mile radius of Chesapeake Arena. The sum of the 
differences between the distance equation with and without the Hometown franchise 
treatment is around $4.5 billion depending on the specification. This suggests the 
Thunder’s presence was associated with an increase of $4.5 billion in sales for the 
immediate downtown area (within one mile) over the three to five years of franchise 
presence. The predicted average growth in sales is $1.5 billion per year.  
In the specification that includes up to a 5 mile radius from the Chesapeake 




Estimated impacts using a 10 mile radius are not significant, which is unsurprising. As 
the concentric circles widen, there are more and more establishments included in the 
model which creates more noise. Any potential NBA franchise effect is expected to 
weaken farther away from the arena. If the sum of the differences is calculated for the 
ten mile radius sample in the same way as before, the estimated impact dwarfs the 
combination of the one mile and five mile estimated impacts. Under this calculation the 
Thunder cost the metro area $21 billion in sales over the full ten mile radius area. 
However, this effect is not statistically significant at any conventional level.  
Establishments further from the arena may have suffered. The Thunder may 
have helped bring in millions of dollars in sales above and beyond the sale of their own 
tickets and products within the stadium. The critical evaluation is the specification 
including a five mile radius from the Chesapeake Arena. It suggests the Thunder 
corresponds with a net increase of over $500 million in sales for the core of the 
Oklahoma City metro. This would compare favorably with the $300 million spent by 
the city to renovate the Chesapeake Arena.  
My results correspond with those of Propheter (2012) and Nelson (2001) and 
contrast those of Baade et al. (2008) and Coates and Humphrey (2002). Harger et al. 
(2015) find similarly mixed impacts but a far less positive impact of new franchises. 
Propheter (2012) considers basketball only cities and many of the newest sports 
facilities. My analysis focuses on a situation with a single major sports team in the city. 
Thus, it may not apply to cities that already have other major sports franchises. 
The policy implications are interesting. In a city like Oklahoma City, where 




arena, a major sports franchise could be a boon for the city. The Thunder potentially 
had such a positive effect because it provided a marginal improvement over having no 
major sports. The marginal impact of a second or third major sports franchise would 
almost certainly be less. Furthermore, consider two of Oklahoma City’s closest major 
cities, Dallas, Texas and Kansas City, Missouri. Both feature multiple major sports 
franchises; Dallas has a National Basketball Association (NBA), a Major League 
Baseball (MLB), and National Football League (NFL) franchise, Kansas City has an 
MLB and an NFL franchise. In both cities, the MLB and NFL teams’ stadiums are 
located adjacent to one another. If an NFL or MLB franchise were located near 
Chesapeake arena, it would be reasonable to suspect that the relocation effect might not 
be as strong since a similar product is already physically located nearby thereby 
cannibalizing its sales. 
What do these results suggest about potential new NBA franchise locations? 
There exist a few obvious choices for NBA expansion based on television market size, 
population, and lack of other major sports. Raleigh, (North Carolina), Louisville 
(Kentucky), Virginia Beach/Norfolk (Virginia), Birmingham (Alabama), Providence 
(Rhode Island), Austin (Texas), Albuquerque (New Mexico), and Grand Rapids 
(Michigan) all lack major sports teams, and are comparable to Oklahoma City in both 
MSA population and television market size. Appendix B presents these selected cities 
with their television market size rank
9
 and MSA population rank
10
. Austin and Grand 
Rapids have larger populations and television markets than Oklahoma City. 
                                                 
9
 As of January 2016. Nielsen’s Local Television Market Universe Estimates 
10




Although this paper’s focus is an NBA franchise, it offers guidance for a wide 
range of extensions. Examining spatially differentiate impacts of other types of local 
public investment and other metropolitan settings would make valuable additions to the 
public investment literature. Attention to identifying the “winners” from the “losers” of 
a place-based investment is important for informing policies, particularly regarding how 
to finance public investments. If benefits are localized, then how should funding be 
structured so that those who stand to benefit the most pay their fair share of the costs of 




Chapter Two: Social Messages and Water Conservation Strategy and 
Policy: A Field Experiment  
The ubiquitous need for potable water is undeniable. Water is essential for the 
most basic aspects of human existence, including personal hygiene and sanitation. 
Access to clean, safe water is one of the most prevalent policy issues of this generation. 
Water scarcity is a growing concern at the global, national, regional and local levels. 
Globally, 1 in 10 people lack access to safe drinking water and face health risks due to 
lack of clean water.
11
 The 2015 World Economic Forum, listed water crisis as the 
highest potential impact global risk and listed water crisis as the 7
th




The United States is not immune to water scarcity issues. The US Government 
Accountability Office claims 40 of 50 state managers expect shortages somewhere in 
their state over the next ten years.
13
  The United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) estimated that 50% of the State of Oklahoma faced extreme drought in 2014.
14
 
For the summer of 2014, the USDA estimated that 20% of the State of Texas faced 
extreme drought and 50% of the state faced moderate drought.
15
 With aquifers depleted 
and constructed in a way that threatens their ability to replenish themselves, 
municipalities are becoming desperate for alternative water sources.  
Communities across the US have resorted to increasingly desperate measures to 
provide drinkable water for their residents. In Texas, Big Spring and Wichita Falls are 














just two communities among several that have resorted to exorbitantly expensive 
reverse osmosis systems to re-purify waste water for reuse and directly return it to 
surface water sources. Since 2013 both communities
16
 have maintained Direct Potable 
Reuse Systems.
17
  This method involves treating reclaimed waste water and mixing it 
with raw surface water before sending this new mix back to a traditional water 
treatment plant. Many other municipalities across the nation are exploring a range of 
supply-oriented options, such as purchasing water from larger cities, building 
reservoirs, and constructing reuse systems. These solutions are often costly and can take 
considerable time to implement. 
Naturally, the water scarcity crisis is a two sided problem. In addition to supply-
oriented policies, municipalities try to impact demand via conservation policies, such as 
watering restrictions, building regulations and requiring low flow faucets and efficient 
appliances, and conservation pricing. Conservation pricing involves setting higher fees 
for water use as well as charging higher fees during peak periods. The costs associated 
with installing time and flow sensitive meters needed for time-variant pricing can be 
substantial which may preclude implementation in all but the most dire circumstances. 
San Francisco, for example, installed smart meters in 180,000 homes and businesses in 
2014 at the cost of $56 million.
18
 
Social messages and awareness campaigns offer a non-pecuniary alternative to 
the conventional water management approaches. There is a growing interest in 
exploiting peer group influences to encourage conservation. Very little research, 










however, investigates the efficacy of these strategies for water conservation. What role, 
if any, can awareness campaigns and peer group comparisons play in water 
management? We address this question. 
This paper investigates how residential water users respond to social awareness 
messages and peer group comparisons. We design and implement a field experiment to 
explore efficacy of conservation messages, tip sheets, and peer comparisons for water 
conservation. Through collaboration with the City of Norman and with financial support 
from the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Oklahoma, we sent mailers 
to 2,163 randomly selected water utility customers of the City of Norman, Oklahoma. 
All selected customers received a general message about water conservation. Some also 
received a tip sheet about how to conserve water. Some also received comparisons 
about their usage relative to that of neighbors. Some received all three treatment 
instruments. This resulted in four distinct treatment groups.  
Observations of treated and non-treated customers from before and after the 
treatment are used to analyze treatment impacts on residential water use. We construct a 
database that goes well beyond simple water consumption records. The customer-
location level observations include detailed information about consumption, house 
features, and weather. Our data includes water consumption records, account records, 
weather records, and housing features. The level of detail in the database is 
unprecedented in existing literature allowing us to extended contemporary analysis in 
significant ways. The empirical specification includes several traditional approaches as 
well as a series of insightful robustness checks. Notably, we specify treatment variables 




Our main findings are similar but of larger magnitude than those found 
elsewhere in the literature. Both conservation letters and peer comparison messages 
have large and statistically significant impacts on water consumption. The tip sheet 
appears to have no impact on the whole sample but may reduce consumption for above 
average users. The highest tier users have the largest and most statistically significant 
response to the various instruments whereas the lowest users only respond to the 
conservation message if they respond at all. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the 
literature. Section three outlines the experiment. Section four describes the estimation 
technique. Section five presents the results. Section six discusses and concludes. 
 
Literature Review 
Social messaging focuses on using non-price mechanisms to induce behavioral 
changes (Lowenstein et al 2007). This can be done by providing information to make 
features of behavior more salient in consumer decisions. The literature on social 
messaging investigates various issues, including charitable giving, food choice, organ 
donation, energy conservation, and water conservation (Downs et al, 2009, Johnson and 
Goldstein, 2003, Ayres et al, 2012, and Ferraro and Price, 2013). Some argue that social 
messages seem to be ineffective in changing behavior (Downs et al, 2009, Choi et al, 
2005).  
Recently, there has been an interest in peer-group comparisons as a means to 
anchor social norms (Ayres et al., 2012, Ferraro and Price, 2013, Brent et al, 2014). The 




harmful behaviors are propagated (Trogdon et al 2008, Powell et al., 2005). The classic 
paper by Winickoff et al. (1984), poses this approach for dealing with surgeon 
performance. Falk and Ichino (2006) use peer comparisons to improve performance in a 
menial task. For a discussion of the use of social messages and peer comparisons in the 
context of charitable giving and of the literature on social-norm marketing refer to 
Ferraro and Price (2013). 
This paper builds on a small but growing literature about norm-based messaging 
in the context of resource conservation. Figure 5 summarizes research which is most 
relevant for this study and highlights our contributions. Most of the studies mail 
messages which include a tip sheet on how to use fewer resources. Heterogeneous 
impacts are also commonly considered. Estimated conservation responses to receiving 
sending social messages fall roughly between 2 and 5%. In the seminal paper on peer 
comparisons and residential water use, Ferraro and Price (2013) take advantage of a 
large field experiment executed by the Cobb County Water Authority. They show that 
peer comparison messages have a stronger influence on users than conservation 
messages and technical advice. The treatment with a peer comparison combined with 














We make three key improvements on Ferraro and Price (2013) some of which 
are also implemented in other places in the literature. First, we use a more appropriate 
comparison group. We compare customers to their neighbors within the same meter 
route. Meter routes divide the city into manageable regions for utility employees 
because water meters must be read manually. Thus, houses in the same meter route are 
physically proximate to each other. In contrast, Ferraro and Price compare users to that 
of the median Cobb County resident. Cobb County is one of the one hundred largest 
counties in the United States with almost 700,000 residents.
19
 Given the diversity across 
neighborhoods, the median resident may not provide a meaningful anchor for a peer 
comparison. As a social norm, the proximate neighborhood is more salient to customer 
decision making. Additionally, we compare the customers to a “water conscious 
neighbor”, one which uses less than 80% of others in the same meter route. In the water 
research, using only lower tiered user as an anchor is unique. Brent et al. (2014) use 
both a low tier comparison, an “efficient neighbor” with similar housing and occupant 
characteristics in the bottom 20% of use of all users, as well as the median user to 
anchor the treated customer.  
Our second improvement is that all of our treatment letters were mailed at the 
same time.  In contrast the Cobb County experiment involved mailing various 
implements in waves that were weeks apart, making it hard to control for relevant 
control variables such as weather. A single wave provides multiple advantages, the 
foremost being the consistency across customers when the message is received. This 






provides assurance that customers receive the message at the same time in month so that 
both the amount of days left in the month and the external conditions such as rain, 
temperature, and exposure to information, is the same for each household in the same 
meter route.  
The third improvement is a refinement of estimation of heterogeneity in 
treatment effects (Allcott, 2011 and Ferraro and Price, 2013). Ferraro and Price 
correctly point out that customers using more than median user should respond 
differently to the treatments than users below the median use. We extend this analysis 
by dividing the sample according to standard deviations away from the median: one 
standard deviation below the median, less than one standard deviation below the 
median, less than one standard deviation above the median, and more than one standard 
deviation above the median. As expected, we find that the further above (below) the 
median the greater (less) the response to the treatment is. We find no evidence of the 
boomerang effect, where customers below the median use more after receiving the 
comparison message.  
A closely related literature focuses on conservation impacts in residential energy 
markets (Allcott, 2011 and Ayres et al., 2012). These find that communicating social 
norm messages, known as the pro-social norm, and providing peer comparisons can 
lead to decreases of residential energy use of around 2% per month.  
This paper is also indirectly related to literature on conservation pricing of 
water. The literature expresses the concern that high income individuals, who are also 
likely to be higher volume users, may not be very responsive to price increases aimed at 




individuals pay a greater share of their income for water. Non-pecuniary strategies, like 
those studied here, provide additional tools for municipalities looking to reduce 
residential water demand. Social messages and peer-group comparisons may be 
powerful complements to conservation pricing strategies because they can target those 
customers least sensitive to price. Such a concern is common in the literature (Ferraro 
and Price, 2011), but, as I show in Estimating Water Demand under a Block Rate 
Structure all customers are price insensitive, have inelastic demand, and those 
customers that consume more are more price sensitive than those who use less.  
 
Experimental Design and Environment  
Background 
The City of Norman lies in Cleveland County just ten miles south of Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma. Norman is the third largest city in the state with a 2010 population of 
approximately 110,925 people.
20
 The City of Norman Water Utility Division services 
approximately 35,000 single family homes. Not all Norman residents are connected to 
the city’s water system. Norman’s water sources include both surface water and 
groundwater. The City shares its surface water source, Lake Thunderbird, with Del City 
and Midwest City,
21
 under the authority of the Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy 
District.
22
 The city has 36 active water wells in addition to several wells taken off line 
due to water quality deficiencies. Three of the 36 active wells have some issues with 
arsenic. Two of the three are able to reach the arsenic standard by being mixed with 











water from other wells to meet EPA standards. The third well is being used to pilot an 
arsenic removal system using chloramination.
23
  
Norman changed its water rate fee structure in March of 2015 preceding our 
experiment by five months.
24
 To our knowledge the City of Norman was not engaged in 
any new conservation efforts during the experiment window. Norman periodically 
sends tip sheets along with a customer’s water bill, but these are sent to all customers at 
a given time. Norman implemented permanent watering restrictions for all of Norman 
in 2014.
25
 Norman had considerably more rainfall in the summer of 2015 than in the 
summer of 2014 but about the same as in the summer in 2013. The average monthly 
rainfall for the months April through September was 17.23 cm in 2015, 5.37 cm in 
2014, and 13.65 cm in 2013. See Figure 6 for these figures as well as the analogous 
ones for July through September. City of Norman water utility staff emphasized the 
importance in rainfall for predicting water consumption. To that end, we account for the 
variance in rainfall in multiple ways. The most critical is the randomization of the 
treatments such that the deviation in rainfall does not systematically bias our estimates 
of treatment responses.  Additionally, we investigate models which include rainfall 
variables to explicitly control for precipitation. Finally, we estimate multiple regression 
specifications, such as including observations from 2012 and 2013 which are more 
representative of the rainfall of summer 2015. 














The City of Norman graciously collaborated with us to execute a mail-based 
randomized field experiment. The City of Norman GIS department provided 
information on house and lot features for each water utility customer so as to facilitate a 
sophisticated analysis without disclosing private customer information or addresses.  
Our experiment targeted single family homes. Some customers are eliminated 
from the sampling pool due to the nature of our experimental design. To facilitate 
comparisons before and after treatment, locations for which there was a customer 
change in either 2014 or 2015 were excluded. We limit the sample, both control and 
treated, to single family homes with consumption between one hundred and one million 
gallons in a single month. These combine to eliminate homes that are empty, experience 
major leaks, or are severely over charged. Leaks and billing errors are not tracked. The 
results, however, are not sensitive to the choice of restriction so we impose the least 
restrictive standard. There is no reason to believe that the restrictions lead to systematic 
bias in our estimates. Of the 34,737 homes served by the City of Norman in July of 
2015, 26,524 households were retained in the sampling pool.  
The City of Norman has 75 routes with an average of 400 homes per route. We 




treatments. By limiting to only half of the routes, we were able to treat approximately 
57 customers per meter route for a total of 2,163 treated homes (8% of the sample pool). 
The remaining 24,361 non-treated homes served as the control group. Letters were 
mailed in July of 2015 using City of Norman official envelopes to increase the 
likelihood of customer exposure to the treatment messages.  
Similar to Ferraro and Price (2013), we use three distinct treatment instruments: 
a conservation message (weak social norm), a peer comparison (strong social norm), 
and a tip sheet listing ways to reduce water use (technical advice). These are described 
in detail below. Customers received a partial treatment or full treatment.  All homes 
which were selected for treatment received the same conservation message. The 
partially treated groups received either a unique peer comparison or a common tip sheet 
in addition to the conservation message. The full treatment group received all three 
instruments. This resulted in four roughly equal sized treatment groups as shown in 
Figure 7. Figure 8 provides a visual representation of how the treatment groups overlap. 





Figure 8: Experiment Design 
 
The conservation message has three distinct parts. First, it describes the supply, 
infrastructure, and drought conditions facing the city. It discusses the surface water 
limitations and the shared surface water arrangement discussed in the introduction. 
Second, the message explains peak load demand issues. On high use days, Norman 
purchases water from Oklahoma City at a premium price. Water use restrictions have 
also been implemented in the past. This section also discussed the need for increased 
water infrastructure and the cost associated with the various plans the city was 
considering. The third component was a pro-social conservation message urging the 
customer to take personal responsibility for helping with water scarcity especially 
during summer months. It also appealed to potential cost savings of reducing water use. 
See Appendix A, for a copy of the message letter. 
 A second partial treatment included a common tip sheet with the conservation 
message. The tip sheet was adapted from the one provided by the City of Norman.
26
 It 






was slightly altered to fit on a single page. The tip sheet presented ways to reduce both 
outdoor and indoor water usage. For example, the tip sheet encourages users to water 
their lawn and garden in the early morning or at night when the sun does not cause as 
much evaporation. See Appendix A, for a sample of the tip sheet. 
The third partial treatment group received a unique peer comparison in 
conjunction with the conservation message. The comparison consisted of five lines of 
text added to the conservation message letter so that all of the information could be 
displayed on a single page. The comparison communicated the customer’s total 
consumption for the months of June through September of 2014 and the same total for a 
“water conscious neighbor”. The water conscious neighbor is defined as the customer 
that used less than 80% of other users in the same water meter route. Anchoring the 
comparison to a lower level of use instead of the median helps to avoid potential 
boomerang impacts since fewer uses would fall below the anchor (Fischer, 2008). Other 
experiments use similar low use comparison group techniques (Ayres, 2012, Brent et al. 
2014).  
The percentage difference between the consumer’s use and the water conscious 
neighbor’s use was included in a third line of text. This “water conscious neighbor” is 
defined as the neighbor who used less than 80% of others in the meter route. It clarified 
that the comparison home was a water conscious user and the criteria were explicitly 
communicated. Congratulations were included for those customers who consumed less 
than the water conscious neighbor, but no admonition was included for other customers. 




feedback as discussed in Ayres et al. (2012). See Appendix A, for a sample of the 
message letter with the peer comparison.  
Due to a miscommunication with the city, the total summer consumption 
amounts were systematically over reported.
27
 However the error did not substantially 
influence the reported peer comparisons reported to customers because the amount of 
the water conscious user was also overestimated.  No customers received a message that 
they used less water than their “water conscious neighbor” when they had actually used 
more.  Furthermore, the reported percentage difference between the customer’s use and 
the water conscious neighbor’s use were only slightly lower than the actual amount on 
average (three tenths of a percent).  See Appendix B for scatter plots and empirical tests 
regarding the nature of the misreporting as well as empirical estimations including the 
level of error. As detailed in Appendix B, the magnitude of the misreporting does not 
impact the estimates of consumption and treatment impacts. We find weak evidence 
that the misreported peer percentage suppressed impact of the peer comparison 
treatment. The city received some calls and complaints about the message but did not 
track the customers. Thus, we could not econometrically account for the customers who 
noticed a discrepancy between their actual use and the reported use. It seems likely that 
most customers did not check the reported numbers against their water bills from over a 
year ago. Our mailings were not sent along with water bills and instead were sent in a 
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 The mistake stemmed from using the transaction amount times 1,000 as opposed to using the 
consumption amount times 100, because the consumption numbers are stored in hundreds of gallons 
used. This resulted in over reporting of about a factor of four and a half at the median user. For example, 
a user who consumes 7,000 gallons (approximately the median during the summer), their transaction 




separate mailing, further decreasing the odds that customers checked these numbers 
against a bill.  
The experimental design allows for a variety of comparisons. We can compare 
all treated customers to untreated customers; the homes that received the peer 
comparison to those that did not; customers that received the tip sheet and those that did 
not; and customers that received all three treatments with to those that did not. Figures 
9-12 demonstrates the various comparisons we make. The shaded groups are the treated 
group whereas the white area is the control. Furthermore, we can compare different 
treatment groups with each other.  















Figure 12: Comparison Group; Full Treatment vs. Non-Full Treatment 
 
The comparisons facilitate a simple cost benefit analysis concerning the efficacy 
of such conservation programs for the City of Norman as well as other water utilities in 
the US. Using water usage records and fixed effects we can control for 
similarities/differences between the treated and untreated groups ex ante.  
 
Empirical Specification  
Data and Variables    
The dataset merges information from three unique and detailed sources: The 
City of Norman Water Utility Division, Cleveland County Assessor, and the National 











     Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Charged Consumption  272,910  69.53 113.62 1  13,559  
      
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Water Conscious User  2,999  38.82 13.75 23.20 87.29 
      




     
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market Value  21,316   157,753.00   282,671.40  0 3.88E+07 
Total Area  21,316   1,813.90   784.31  0 14344 
Year Built  21,211   1,979.19   28.68  0 2014 
Baths  21,316   2.20   0.82  0 30 
Pool Area  21,316   52.80   173.98  0 3088.781 
 




     
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Rainfall  59,224  475.93 323.16 0  1,660  
      
 
Norman’s residential water data records include customer and location 
identifiers, rate class, cycle and route identifiers, charged consumption, transaction 
amount, and date of meter reading for the years 2002-2015. The customer identifier 
tracks a particular account held by a water utility customer. Thus, it changes when a 
new customer establishes a new account with the city. The location identifier is unique 
for each parcel and does not change with account changes. The rate class identifies the 
customer type: single family, multifamily, commercial, or other. For this paper we focus 
solely on single family homes. The charged consumption is gallons of water consumed 
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 Year 2014, consumption greater than zero, and customers unchanged. 
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 WC_User is the water conscious neighbor defined in the peer comparison letter. The 20% user in 2015 
30
 2014 cross section of housing data. 
31




(in hundreds) at a location. The transaction amount is the amount the customer paid in 
dollars. We also know the exact date of the meter reading. Meters are read manually by 
city employees. Customers within the same meter route have their meters read on the 
same day. Meter reading routes are scheduled throughout the month so that not all 
meter routes are read on the same week of the month. Figure 13 shows the City of 
Norman’s meter route map. Meter routes control for many relevant neighborhood 
factors for which we do not have data.  
The second source of data is from County Assessor Office which the City of 
Norman’s GIS staff graciously merged with the water utility records. This provides a 
cross section of housing features that includes market value, assessed value, total area, 
year built, rooms, bedrooms, baths, lot size, road area, pavement area, parking area, 
pool area, and building footprint for the year 2014.  
Finally, the National Weather Service tracks precipitation using a series of sensors 
located throughout the City. A map of the sensors locations is displayed in Figure 14. 
Rainfall, measured in tenths of millimeters, is mapped from sensor to household by 


















Test for Randomization 
We confirm that treatments were randomly assigned to customers by evaluating 
differences of mean water consumption by group. Table 10 shows the means for the 
treated and non-treated customers for different treatment combinations using all months 
in 2014. We apply a t-test of means for two samples which compares the means from 
the two variables: the null hypothesis is that the difference between the means is zero.  
This encompasses all groups that receive the various implements. Notice that by testing 
the CM group (conservation message), we test the entire treatment group against the 
untreated group. We fail to reject the null of no difference in means between the treated 
and non-treated groups for all tests.  This gives us confidence that the randomization 
was effective in creating treatment groups that are the same as the untreated group with 
respect to our outcome of interest. 
 
Table 10: Evidence that Treatment Groups are Random 
 





CM   27,261 67.73 0.66 108.69 
Control 253,148 67.27 0.23 113.45 
      
CM_PEER 13,333 67.51 1.00 115.89 
Control 267,076 67.30 0.22 112.85 
      
CM_TIP 13,631 65.92 0.66 77.06 
Control 266,778 67.39 0.22 114.53 
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Panel Data Specifications 
We are interested in examining the efficacy of using non-pecuniary strategies to 
encourage water conservation. The basic empirical approach estimates water 
consumption as a function of policy treatments in a panel data setting which allows for 
household specific and month fixed effects. The general specification is as follows: 
 
(2) Cit=α + βTreatmentit + δ*Xit + γHi + λMt + εit,  
 
 
where Cit, is charged water consumption in 100s of gallons for customer i at month t, α 
is the constant term, the vector X of time varying control variables such as rainfall, H 
accounts for individual customer fixed effects, M is a set of monthly dummy variables, 
and ε is the error term. Our baseline specification uses monthly consumption data for 
the months from April to September for 2014 and 2015. Thus we have three months of 
observations in 2015 before and after the mailings occurred. We also include the same 
months in 2014 as a baseline for the customers. In addition, spring and summer months 
are associated with more outdoor watering needs which are more likely to be influenced 
than winter months where basic water needs (showers, flushing toilets, laundry) drive 
water consumption. Finally, these are months when peak period demands are likely to 
exceed supply. For robustness we consider adding more years of historical consumption 
(e.g., 2012-2015, and 2013-2015) as well as limiting the sample to just the summer 




Treatment is a vector of variables indicating months for which a customer has been 
exposed to a given type or combination of treatment messages (intent to treat).  As 
discussed below, the manner in which treatment variables are specified is flexible.  The 
β coefficients provided estimates of different treatment impacts on water consumption. 
 
Estimation Results 
Estimates with Incremental Treatment Variables 
The most common approach for specifying treatment impacts is to define variables in 
an incremental fashion (Ferraro and Price, 2013, Brent et al, 2014). Following this 
approach, a variable is created for each of the three individual treatment instruments: 
conservation message (CM), tip sheet (TIP), and peer group comparison (PEER). If the 
customer receives a particular type of treatment message, then the corresponding 
variable is set to 1 for all months after June of 2015 (post treatment period), and is set to 
zero otherwise. For example, if a customer receives the conservation message, then CM 
is set to equal one in all months after June 2015, and is zero otherwise. If the customer 
also receives the peer comparison, then both the CM and PEER dummy variables will 
be set to one after June 2015. If a customer receives the conservation message and the 
tip sheet, then both CM and TIP variables will be set to 1 in the post treatment period. 
Finally, if a customer receives the full treatment, then all three treatment dummy 
variables will be set to one in the post treatment period.  
The corresponding empirical specification is as follows:     
 





In this specification, β1 represents the impact of sending customers only the 
conservation message compared with sending no message.  β2 captures the incremental 
change in water consumption associated with sending the TIP message beyond the 
impact of sending only the conservation message.  Similarly, β3 represents the 
incremental effect of sending the peer comparison along with the conservation message 
compared with sending only the conservation message.  The estimated impact on water 
conservation for an individual receiving the full treatment would be the sum of the β 
coefficients.  
The estimates corresponding to Equation 3 are shown in Table 11. The first 
column includes water utility usage from 2014 to 2015 and serves as our benchmark 
estimates.  The estimated coefficients for the conservation message and peer 
comparison are negative and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. The conservation message has an economically important impact. Sending 
only this weak social norm message leads to an estimated 723 gallon (9.9% of the 
median) reduction in monthly water use. When combined with the conservation 
message, the peer comparison reduces predicted water consumption by an addition 365 
gallons per month (5% of the median). This effect is stronger than that found in the 
previous literature which may be due in part a priming effect. As discussed above, the 
citizens of Norman faced a water rate change in the months leading up our experiment, 
and while this price impact is universal to all customers in Norman, it may have made 
citizens more aware of the nature of water issues, making those recipients of our social 










In contrast to the conservation message and peer comparisons, the tip sheet 
appears to be ineffective in inducing additional water conservation. The estimated 
coefficient associated with TIP is positive and statistically insignificant.  Receiving the 
tip sheet in addition to the conservation message would result in an estimated 470 
gallon reduction
34
 in water consumption (6.4% of median).  Ferraro and Price (2013) 
also find that the tip sheet is not particularly effective. Their results suggest no greater 
than a 1% decrease in water consumption in response to receiving technical advice. 
Because Norman was facing the water rate change, it is possible that consumers were 
more exposed to technical advice than usual, as a description of ways to help them save 
money after the rate change, that our technical advice may have had less of an impact.  
The second column of Table 11 presents estimates when only observations for 
summer months July through September are included. Given randomization, we don’t 
need the pre-treatment observations from spring to identify the treatment impacts on 
summer consumption.  In fact, focusing on the summer period may create less noise in 
our estimates.  The estimated coefficients vary slightly from those presented in column 
1. The signs and significance are unchanged. The relative differential in size of 
coefficients associated with treatment variables are of the same order magnitude.   
Column 3 of Table 11 presents results when we include observations from 2013. 
This provides additional historical observations of customer’s water consumption which 
are captured in the household fixed effects. One reason to expand the years of coverage 
is because 2014 was an unusually dry summer when compared with 2015. A second 
reason is the price change in 2015. The weather in summer of 2013 was more similar to 
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 The signs and levels of significance are the same on all estimated 
coefficients and the estimated treatment impacts are larger (more negative). We find 




The fourth column of Table 6 shows results of estimating equation 2 when 
weather variables are included.  RAIN is the sum of rainfall for the month in tenths of 
millimeters (micrometers). Lagged RAIN is the previous month’s sum. As expected, 
rainfall is a powerful predictor of water consumption.  For example an extra centimeter 
(10 millimeters) of rainfall in a month reduces consumption by about 50 gallons a 
month.  The previous month’s rainfall has a similarly sized or larger effect. Our 
estimates suggest that, at a constant marginal impact, rainfall in a given month and the 
previous month account for about 1,000 gallons of a consumer’s use on average for the 
months of April through September.  Regarding treatment impacts, the sign and 
significance is similar for the conservation message coefficient.  The size and level of 
significance for the peer comparison treatment impact falls.  We look further into the 
robustness implications using the alternative specifications below.  
Typical approaches include treatment interaction variables as well as pre and 
post treatment variables in a difference in difference type specification (Brent et al, 
2016, Ferraro and Price, 2013). We avoid this due to the sheer volume of potential 
interactions as well as the difficulty of interpreting interaction terms when treatments 
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 The customer change definitions remain unchanged from the baseline specification. 
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 For brevity we do not report these results. Note that the condition of no change in customer 
identification is not applied for years prior to 2014. Thus, if there were changes, then the prior residents 
would be assumed to be the same customer. This is done to preserve the size of the treated group.  Given 




are defined using incremental approach.  Furthermore, since we have customer and 
house level data we can utilize customer specific effects. 
 
Exclusive Sub-treatment Categories 
As an alternative to the incremental approach, treatment effects can be 
investigated by defining mutually exclusive treatment categories.  For example, CMO is 
defined as a dummy variable representing months after June 2015 for customers which 
received only the conservation message. CM_TIP is set to one for months after June 
2015 for customers who receive both the tip sheet and the conservation message, but 
not the peer comparison.  Similarly CM_PEER is an indicator variable for customers 
which receive the conservation message and peer comparison, but not the tip sheet.  
Finally, CM_TIP_PEER is set to one in months after June 2015 for customers who 
receive the full treatment.   
The corresponding regression specification is: 
 
(4) Cit=a + β1CMOit + β2CM_TIPit+ β3CM_PEERit+ β4CM_TIP_PEERit  
+ δXit + γHi +λMt + εit,   
 
Creating a variable for each possible treatment combination avoids the need for 
interaction variables and makes interpretation of treatment impacts straight forward. 
The drawback is the loss of some power in the estimation process. Reducing the number 




The estimates corresponding to Equation 4 are given in Table 12.  The first 
column uses consumption data for April through September of 2014 and 2015.  All of 
the estimated treatment group coefficients are negative, and all except CM_TIP, are 
significant at conventional levels (5% for CM and 1% for CM_PEER and 
CM_TIP_PEER). The estimated impacts range from a high of -0.267 for the CM_TIP 
group to a low of -6.320 for the CM_PEER group.  Sending a combined conservation 
message and peer group comparison message leads to an estimated 632 gallon reduction 
in monthly water consumption, which is an additional 182 gallons per month in 
conservation compared with sending only the conservation message. In contrast to the 
estimates from above, the estimates generated using the exclusive treatment categories 
fit closely with the theoretical predictions: the strong social norm (peer comparison) is 
expected to generate a larger behavioral responses than a weak social norm 
(conservation message). 
The tip sheet and conservation letter combination has an economically and 
statistically insignificant impact in the baseline estimation of Equation 4.  Adding the 
tip sheet with the CM message reduces conservation: if just the conservation message is 
sent, 450 gallons would be conserved, but if both the tip sheet and the conservation 
message are sent, only an estimated 26 gallons would be conserved. Similarly, 
comparing the estimated coefficients for CM_PEER -6.32) and CM_TIP_PEER (-
5.582) also suggests that sending the TIP sheet in combination with other messages is 
counterproductive. In this case, the strong social norm appears to counter the negative 










As before, we investigate alternative specifications.  Column three shows that 
extending the data to include 2013 increases the size of the estimated treatment impacts.  
Estimates using just the summer months are very similar to those using April to 
September months. The specification adding the rain variables is notable.  The size of 
all the treatment coefficients increase slightly and the estimated coefficient for 
CM_TIP, which are insignificant in other regressions, becomes more negative and 
significant. Given the importance of rain in driving water consumption, a clearer 




Heterogeneity of impacts across classes of users is a major topic in the literature. 
To address this, we split the sample into four tiers according to whether customers use 
more or less than the median and whether they are more than a standard deviation away.  
The lowest (highest) tier includes customers who use more than one standard deviation 
above (below) the median level. The low (high) tier includes customers who fall within 
one standard deviation below (above) the median. These groups are all defined using 
the customer’s 2014 summer use relative to the distribution in 2014. The median 
consumption for the full sample is 6,900 gallons for the entire sample pool, 17,700 
gallons for the highest tier, 7,400 gallons for the high tier, 4,000 gallons for the low tier, 
and 3,800 gallons for lowest. The estimates for both the incremental and the exclusive 
















Three important results emerge.  First, the farther above the median the 
customer is, the more she responds to treatment messages. The estimated reduction of 
consumption associated with sending the conservation message only (CMO) ranges 
from 167 gallons for the low tier customers (4.2% of median for the lowest tier group) 
to 1,973 gallons for the highest tier users (10.7% reduction). The estimated coefficients 
are significant only for the high and highest tier groups.  The full treatment impact 
ranges from a reduction of 1,129 gallons (14.5% of the median) to 2,570 gallons (13.9% 
of the median) for the high and highest tiers, respectively. As pointed out by Ferraro 
and Price (2013) this is key because it gives municipalities a way to influence the 
consumption of those users who are least likely to be sensitive to price.  
Second, while low tier uses do respond to combined conservation and peer 
message, the lowest tier users do not. The differential response suggests the power of 
social messaging given that median use between the two groups is only 200 gallons per 
month (about 5 loads of laundry). The lack of response to social messages for the lowest 
tier customers is not unexpected. These customers may feel less need to reduce their 
usage as they are already efficient, or perhaps they simply have less ability to adjust 
their consumption. Unlike high tier customers with big lawns and swimming pools, the 
lowest tier customers probably use water almost exclusively for things such as 
showering, cooking, and personal hygiene, which are not easily adjusted or have very 
small impacts on their consumption. There is likely to be a very small financial impact 
for conservation as well.  
Third, we find no evidence of a boomerang effect. Other papers, especially those 




relatively low use sometimes leads to an increase in consumption (Ayres et al., 2012). It 
is likely that we find no such evidence because we compare the customers in our study 
with their water conscious neighbor (in the 20
th
 percentile of the neighborhood 
consumption distribution) instead of with the mean or median for aggregate area. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
We investigate whether social messages influences water consumption by 
implementing a carefully designed random experiment. The experimental design allows 
for alternative specifications of treatment variables, both the traditional sequential 
approach as well as exclusive treatment group approach. Not all results are robust to the 
empirical specification of treatment groups. However, some general conclusions 
emerge.   
Taken as a whole, our estimates suggest that there is strong behavioral response 
to several of our treatment instruments. We see decreases between 300 and 900 gallons 
per month for the various implements and combinations. This translates to roughly an 
8% decrease, which is much larger than results found in the literature (in the range of 
4% per month). The setting for our experiment is different than other studies in key 
ways including; the rainfall differences between 2014 and 2015, and the 2015 water rate 
change.  
Whereas the literature has generally found the peer comparison message to be 
more effective than a simple conservation message (weak norm), we find mixed 
evidence on the matter. This is likely a result of the difficulty of implementing the 




their consumption by 8.7%, while the conservation message leads to a 6.2% decrease 
according to the incremental specification.  Consistent with previous literature, we find 
the tip sheet to be ineffective. The estimated coefficients on the tip sheet treatments are 
insignificant is most specifications. This is unsurprising, as technical information has 
been generally found to have little to impact on consumers’ behavior in regards to water 
consumption.  
Perhaps most useful for policy makers is the evidence of heterogeneity in 
behavior responses to treatments. Specifically, higher than median users display greater 
responses to social messages.  The estimates suggest that sending a conservation 
message to the highest tier customers leads to an estimated two thousand gallons, or 
10.7%, reduction in water consumption for customers in this tier. Consumers who use 
within one standard deviation above the median level of consumption respond to a 
conservation message with about 500 gallons a month (6.4%) reduction in consumption.  
Even the low tier users (within one standard deviation below the median) respond to 
conservation messages by reducing consumption by 400 gallons a month (4.2%). The 
response is even greater when the full treatment (conservation message, peer 
comparison and tip sheet) is sent to customers.  
Our results provide practical guidance for water utility managers. Notably, the 
common practice of sending tip sheets is probably not effective in encouraging 
conservation. Instead, conservation messages and peer comparisons appear to be more 
cost effective. An upper bound estimate of the cost to send social messages to water 




roughly $18,000), less if included with water bill.
37
  A small amount of staff time would 
be needed to develop the conservation and peer comparison messages following the 
procedure used in our experiment.  
The City of Norman produced 217 million gallons of water in July of 2014 for 
single family homes, and about 500 million gallons for all users. An 8% reduction in 
consumption for all Norman single family homes would save the city 17.4 million 
gallons a month, or roughly an entire peak summer use day of savings per month.
38
 
Treatment plant cost per gallon is about $3.25 per 1,000 gallons. So 17.4 million gallons 
saved leads to $55,600 savings in production costs.
39
 Thus, a very conservative estimate 
on the return on mailing to ALL single family homes Norman water utility customers 




This however, does not consider water utility fee revenue implications.  Notably, 
Norman has an inverted rate structure where rates for all gallons consumed increase 
with consumption tiers.
41
 For instance, customers who use over 20,000 gallons per 
month pay $6.80 per thousand gallons
42
 compared with customers using less than 5,000 
gallons who pay $3.35 per thousand gallons of consumption. Thus conservation from 
the higher tier users could impact water utility revenues in a negative fashion.
43
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 This is the price we were charged. The actual cost is certain to be less. 
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 Based on saving 8% of July single family home use for 2014 
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 http://www.normanok.gov/utilities/wt/water-treatment-plant  
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 For those gallons above 20,000; they still pay $3.35 for their 1,000-5,000 gallons.  
43
 The City of Norman recently agreed to a contract worth over $700,000 per year with Oklahoma City to 





There are important limitations for making out of sample predictions either for 
the City of Norman or for other cities based on our results.  Notably the City of Norman 
implemented a water rate increase in March of 2015. This may have influenced the 
generalizability of our estimates in several ways. First, the rate increase required 
obtaining a majority vote in a local election. Thus, there was considerable discussion 
about water issues just prior to our treatment implementation.  Second, customers 
probably adjusted to the new rate increase over the months following the rate increase. 
This omitted factor may bias our estimates.  Finally, the high and highest tier users may 
have been primed to respond to the conservation and social messages due to observing 
the water rate increases on their water bills. This could be driving heterogeneity in 
responses. Another potential mitigating factor is the drastic weather differences between 
2014 and 2015. We attempt to account for these factors by using month and year fixed 
effects in various specification. However, caution is warranted in making causal 
inferences from our results. 
There are many potential extensions to this research.  For example, in a separate 
chapter, we estimate price elasticity of water demand using the March 2015 water rate 
changes in Norman, Oklahoma. It would be interesting to investigate alternative 
measures of weather impacts in model of water consumption.  We also hope to conduct 
a similar experiment in other cities or even repeat it in Norman so as to provide further 
robustness test of our main results. Such extensions will be useful for further informing 






Chapter Three: Estimating Water Demand under a Block Rate 
Structure: Unraveling Demand and Supply 
There is a great interest in understanding water demand. Conservation pricing 
and impacts on utility revenues are important in the growing era of water scarcity. 
Economists are hardly strangers in this discussion. There are a great many papers 
estimating water demand.  
Water utilities often impose block rate structures rather than a flat fee or a 
uniform rate. Block rate structures group users by consumption and charge different 
rates for consumption within each block. Block structures can be increasing or 
decreasing. Increasing rate structures are consistent with conservation pricing and 
marginal costs pricing. For instance, communities with multiple water sources tend to 
rely on the cheapest source first (usually well water) and add other sources as demand 




Estimating demand is more complex in the presence of an inverted rate block 
structure, in which the rate per unit of consumption increases across blocks. Under these 
structures customers choose their utility rate and consumption simultaneously. To 
estimate demand, a researcher must know in which block a customer falls. With a rate 
increase, some customers may reduce consumption, thus reducing both the marginal 
cost of their consumption as well as their average rate for all quantities consumed. 
Without accounting for the block rate structure, researchers end up estimating supply 
curves- how much customers in each rate group consume. Furthermore, without 






observing rate structure changes, it is also difficult to tease out demand and supply 
factors. Accordingly, it is crucial to account for the block rate structure when estimating 
demand and demand elasticities. We estimate separate demand curves for individual 
block rate groups. 
Our major contribution is explicitly accounting for the block rate structure by 
estimating water demand for individual rate block groups. To our knowledge this 
approach has not been used for estimating water demand. Additionally, we leverage a 
more powerful data set, possessing a longer time horizon, greater numbers of 
customers, and more robust available controls. Our data on water billing records are 
more comprehensive than the previous literature in that we observe water billing 
records on a more disaggregated level in a panel setting.  
Our data allows us to investigate water demand responses surrounding two rate 
changes that occur in the City of Norman, Oklahoma. Both the estimation approach and 
the superior data allow us to address shortcomings in previous empirical research.   
We use a dataset spanning from 2002 to 2015 to evaluate rate structure changes 
in 2006 and in 2015.  We employ monthly customer level panel data of consumption 
and weather variables as well as detailed house and lot features for 2014. We find that 
consumers respond to price increases by reducing consumption. Our analysis reconciles 
previous estimates of upward sloping demand curves with the Law of Demand. Our 
results are consistent with the economic theory concerning demand and support 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the 
literature. Section three describes the estimation technique. Section four presents the 
results. Section five discusses price elasticities and concludes. 
 
Literature Review 
The literature on water demand is long and detailed. Economists have been estimating 
water demand since the late 1960s. Intuitively estimating demand is straight forward: 
estimate quantity demanded at different prices. However, this is not so straightforward 
when different customers face different prices: the aggregate demand reflects different 
prices for different customers. While price discrimination is certainly not a new topic it 
appears to have been largely neglected in the water demand literature. It is even more 
difficult if price changes are not observed. A review of the literature suggests that both 
of these issues arise when estimating water demand. 
The literature essentially breaks down into two broad categories, those whose 
datasets that do not include observations of price changes (Foster and Beattie, 1979; 
Nauges and Thomas, 2003; Bell and Griffin, 2011; Olmstead et al, 2007) and those 
whose datasets do (Billings and Agthe, 1980; Agthe and Billings, 1980; Nieswiadomy 
and Molina, 1989; Hansen and Narayanan, 1981; Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995; Pint, 
1999; Carver and Boland, 1980; Dandy et al, 1997; Danielson, 1979).  
 Papers that do not include price changes observe multiple jurisdictions in order 
to get price variation. This is done by using regional aggregates (Foster and Beattie, 
1979), city aggregates (Nauges and Thomas, 2003; Bell and Griffin, 2011) or 




demand curves for water aggregated to an entire region. This presents an obvious 
interpretation issue because these cities and regions face innumerable differences from 
their water rate structures to their economies. Furthermore, water rates are endogenous: 
cities with lower rates may have lower consumption but water conservation norms may 
also lead to the lower rates. Thus, estimating demand by relying on price variations 
across city or region instead of within jurisdiction, introduces potential endogeneity 
between rates and water consumption. Some of these papers address the issues that 
coincide with increasing block rate price structures by using advanced econometric 
techniques such as, dynamic models (Nagues and Thomas, 2003; Bell and Griffin, 
2011) and discrete choice models (Hewitt and Hanneman, 1995; Olmstead et al, 2007).  
 Studies that include price changes use pooled cross section datasets (Billings 
and Agthe, 1980; Agthe and Billings, 1980; Nieswiadomy and Molina, 1989; Hansen 
and Narayanan, 1981; Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995; Carver and Boland, 1980) or have 
small panels (Pint, 1999; Dany et al, 1997; Danielson, 1979). These studies universally 
face small sample sizes. The largest panel dataset includes only 600 households (Pint, 
1999). The pooled cross sections are also small. For example, Nieswiadomy and Molina 
(1989) include only 100 sampled homes per year and Hewitt and Hanneman (1995) use 
this same dataset. The results from these studies uncover a correlation between higher 
prices and higher water use. Pint (1999) appropriately points out that Ordinary Least 
Squares and fixed effect models fail to produce estimates of downward sloping demand 
curves when increasing block rates are not considered. Thus, the unexpected results 




Naturally, all of these papers share the common assumption that there exists a 
single demand for all users, whether users are within a single municipality or not.  That 
some studies using a single city with an increasing block rate structure find an upward 
sloping demand curve is understandable: variation in price comes from the increasing 
block rate structure and not from actual price (rate structure) changes. Such studies 
actually estimate supply curves: the amount of demand fulfilled for different block 
groups. In contrast other studies obtain variation in price by including multiple 
municipalities in the sample. This introduces potential for policy endogeneity: previous 
consumption is likely to impact price structures across municipalities. To the extent that 
increased consumption may exceed supply capacity, consumption trends may drive 
price increases due to the need to expand capacity (Olmstead et al, 2007).  
We improve upon previous literature by using detailed panel data to estimate separate 
demand curves for individual block rate groups before and after price changes. To our 
knowledge no other papers in the water research uses this approach. This 
simultaneously avoids assuming a common demand curve along the block groups and 
common consumption behavior across municipalities. 
 
Empirical Specification 
Background on Norman’s Water Utility Rates 
Our empirical strategy involves investigating two water utility rate changes in 
the City of Norman, Oklahoma, which is in the southern portion of Oklahoma City’s 
metropolitan area. With a 2010 population of approximately 110,925 people, Norman is 




Thunderbird, well water, and purchases from Oklahoma City. Like many cities across 
the country, population growth and increasing regulatory standards have stressed its 
water utility division. The need to expand and upgrade water treatment infrastructure 
has driven water rate increases.  
The City of Norman is unique in that utility rate increases require voter approval 
in local elections.
45
 This makes rate increases less frequent and of larger magnitude than 
if the City Council or the Utility Department had the authority to adjust rates at their 
own discretion. This offers an interesting and unique opportunity to explore customer 
responses to changes in water rates. Notably, however, Norman’s policy environment is 
not representative of most municipalities. We investigate consumption patterns 
surrounding Norman’s 2006 and 2015 water rate increases.  The 2006 increase was the 
first successful change since water utility rates were first implemented in 1999.  Table 
15 summarizes the rate structures in place prior to the 2006 rate increase, between 2006 
and the 2015 rate increase, and after the 2015 rate change. Notice the “inverted” rate 
structure in which the block rates charged per 1000 gallons used increase with 
consumption. This structure corresponds to conservation pricing as well as increased 
marginal costs associated with peak demand costs.  
  









Table 15: Water Rates and Rate Structure. 
 
1999 2006 2015 
Base Fee $0.00 $4.00 $6.00 
Cost per each 1,000 gallon in each consumption range 
<=1,000 $2.01 $2.00 $3.35 
1,000 < C <= 2,000 $1.73   
2,000 < C <= 5,000 $1.14   
     
     
5,000 < C <= 15,000
*
  $2.10 $4.10 
     
     
15,000 < C <= 20,000 $2.00 $2.75 $5.20 
     
     
     
     
c > 20,000 $4.00 $4.95 $6.80 
     
 
We investigate the 2006 and 2015 rate changes in separate analyses. We do this 
to find the elasticity at each point in time rather than to capture the average elasticity 
over a 13 year period. Separate evaluation acknowledges the potential that other factors 
could have influenced elasticities.  Furthermore, we are able to frame the 2006 change 
with more years of data.  For 2006, we include data from 2002 to 2010. For the 2015 






Data and Variables 
We take advantage of three unique and detailed data sets: the City of Norman 
Water Utility administrative billing records, the Cleveland County Assessor records, 
and the National Weather Service data for the city of Norman. We summarize these by 
block rate group in Tables 16 and 17.  
 
Table 16: Summary Statistics by Group 2002-2010 
Group One      
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumption  79,775 43.19 313.90 1 87,600 
Log Consumption 79,775 3.41 0.87 0 11.38 
Rainfall 13,429 8.99 6.51 0 31.71 
Market Value 1,209 144.35 83.88 0 1,391.79 
Year Built 1,178 1999 4.11 1992 2014 
Baths 1,209 2.11 0.66 0 8.00 
Pervious Surface 1,209 6.43 26.78 0.21 663.35 
Pool Area 1,209 1.04 7.41 0 78.64 
 
Group Two      
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumption 156,506 88.94 63.97 1 6,391 
Log Consumption 156,506 4.28 0.69 0 8.76 
Rainfall 34,783 9.31 6.57 0 31.71 
Market Value 3,369 172.67 85.41 0 1,477.35 
Year Built 3,327 1998 4.08 1992 2014 
Baths 3,369 2.27 0.69 0 8.00 
Pervious Surface 3,369 7.03 30.27 4.2E-07 1,216.55 






Group Three      
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumption 30,379 151.59 89.73 1 2,095 
Log Consumption 30,379 4.83 0.68 0 7.65 
Rainfall 5,781 9.87 7.03 0 31.71 
Market Value 675 220.45 85.00 0 616.58 
Year Built 669 1999 4.03 1992 2014 
Baths 675 2.68 0.80 0 5.00 
Pervious Surface 675 9.01 28.55 0.22 461.47 
Pool Area 675 8.01 19.74 0 145.70 
 
Group Four      
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumption 35,154 254.00 466.55 1 75,501 
Log Consumption 35,154 5.25 0.80 0 11.23 
Rainfall 5,404 9.99 7.29 0 31.71 
Market Value 758 306.92 175.09 0 2,082.46 
Year Built 755 1998 4.17 1992 2007 
Baths 758 3.18 1.00 0 8.00 
Pervious Surface 758 10.92 25.33 1.04 411.10 
Pool Area 758 19.53 30.63 0 185.27 
 
Table 17: Summary Statistics by Group 2010-2015 
Group One      
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumption 188,680 40.66 282.16 1 90,143 
Log Consumption 188,680 3.36 0.85 0 11.41 
Rainfall 96,920 9.32 9.59 0 61.03 
Market Value 3,147 156.65 69.83 0 1,218.19 
Year Built 3,078 2002 6.08 1992 2014 
Baths 3,147 2.12 0.63 0 8.00 
Pervious Surface  3,147 6.77 27.78 2.41E-06 1,070.58 









     
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumption 183,209 92.96 221.53 1 88,239 
Log Consumption 183,209 4.28 0.74 0 11.39 
Rainfall 113,885 9.35 9.65 0 64.39 
Market Value 3,919 208.66 118.94 0 1,907.63 
Year Built 3,875 2002 6.05 1992 2014 
Baths 3,919 2.49 0.93 0 30.00 
Pervious Surface  3,919 7.59 25.98 4.15E-07 1,216.55 
Pool Area 3,919 4.30 15.63 0 185.27 
 
Group Three 
     




Consumption 24,719 166.22 123.00 1 3,558 
Log Consumption 24,719 4.83 0.84 0 8.18 
Rainfall 14,221 9.45 9.70 0 61.03 
Market Value 539 280.42 123.53 0 944.43 
Year Built 535 2002 6.44 1992 2014 
Baths 539 3.05 0.96 0 7.00 
Pervious Surface  539 8.08 9.59 0.49 90.25 
Pool Area 539 11.10 23.77 0 169.19 
 
Group Four 
     
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Consumption 19,738 297.75 556.25 1 16,952 
Log Consumption 19,738 5.22 1.00 0 9.74 
Rainfall 8,526 9.23 9.36 0 61.03 
Market Value 364 390.69 234.03 78.955 2,468.12 
Year Built 364 2002 6.73 1992 2014 
Baths 364 3.56 0.98 2 7.00 
Pervious Surface  364 11.55 14.37 1.46 83.05 
Pool Area 364 21.15 30.93 0 194.27 
 
Norman’s residential water data records include customer and location 
identifiers, rate class, cycle and route identifiers, charged consumption, transaction 




residences which account for approximately 86% of the water utility customers (27,044 
in 2005 and 31,317 in July of 2015).
46
 The charged consumption is the amount of 
gallons, in hundreds, consumed at the location. Date of meter reading is a key variable. 
Meters are read manually by city employees. Meter reading routes are scheduled 
throughout the month so that each route is read within the same week of the month.  
Customers within the same meter route have their meters read on the same week. Meter 
routes control for many relevant neighborhood-specific factors for which data are not 
available. Figure 13 shows the City of Norman’s meter route map. 
The City of Norman’s GIS staff graciously merged records from the County 
Assessor’s Office with the water utility records. This data covers 28,509 homes of 
single family residential water utility customers in Norman. This cross section of 
housing features includes market value, assessed value, total area, year built, baths, lot 
size, and pool area, for the year 2014. We assume that the housing characteristics from 
2014 are valid for the homes in the sample for all observed years. To ensure this 
assumption is reasonable, we drop homes built before 1992 from the sample. Homes 
built after the relevant price changes and not included in the corresponding price change 
analyses. For example, a home built in 2006 is not included in the estimation of the 
2006 price change because the home did not exist in 2005. Since there are no 
observations of consumption prior to the price change, it is not possible to assign this 
customer to a block rate group.   
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 There were 30,771 (31,188) single family resident customers out of 36,317 (36,810) customers in July 




Market value is measured in thousands of dollars. Year built indicates when the 
house was completed.  Baths measures the number of bathrooms, a full bath (1) has a 
toilet and a shower or bath tub and a half bath (0.5) indicates a toilet without a tub or 
shower. We calculate pervious surface area by subtracting all impervious surfaces—
including the house’s footprint, the pavement, and road area—from the lot size.  
Measured in thousands of square feet, pervious surface represents the outside areas of a 
parcel that would potentially require watering. The data includes the surface area of a 
pool in tens of square feet as measured through satellite imagery by Norman’s GIS 
staff.   
Finally, the National Weather Service tracks precipitation using a series of 
sensors located throughout the City. A map of the rainfall sensor locations is displayed 
in Figure 14. Rainfall, measured in tenths of millimeters and normalized to centimeters, 
is mapped from sensor to household by census tract. Because rainfall values are 
assigned to those homes in the same census tract, some homes do not have rainfall 
observations.  Rainfall values are available for approximately 19,000 homes.
47
 The 




Customers are grouped based on their consumption and the City of Norman’s 
water rate block group ranges effective from 2006 onward. The first group includes 
customers consuming up to and including 5,000 gallons. The second group includes 
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customers consuming between 5,001 and 15,000 gallons. The third group includes 
customers consuming between 15,001 gallons and 20,000 gallons. The fourth includes 
customers consuming more than 20,000 gallons. Table 15 presents the rate brackets and 
associated rates in effect from 1999 onward. Both the 2006 and 2015 rate changes are 
included.  
There are several options for assigning customers to groups, especially since use 
varies by month and season. We calculate the customer’s average use in the summer 
months of the year preceding the price change. This smooths consumption to allow for 
different timing of intense water use such as filling a swimming pool. For the price 
change implemented in May of 2006, customers are assigned based on their average 
monthly consumption from May through September of 2005. For the price change 
effective in March of 2015, customers are assigned based on their average consumption 
from March through September of 2014. Notably, the group assignment is static even if 
a consumer reduces consumption enough to bump to a lower group following the price 
change. 
By estimating each group’s consumption, we can identify responses to the price 
change controlling for initial consumption patterns. We do not explicitly model prices 
since each group faces a unique block group price schedule pre and post rate changes. 
The corresponding empirical specification is as follows: 
 





where Cit is the natural log of water consumption for household i in month t. Pricet is 
post price change variable, that is a dummy variable marking the month in which the 
price change occurred and is equal to one for all months after the price change. 
Weatherit is a vector of weather variables, including sum of monthly rainfall, lagged 
monthly rainfall, standard deviation of rainfall, lagged standard deviation of rainfall. 
House is a vector of household characteristics. These include market value, total area of 
the house, lot area, pool area, number of bathrooms and year built. Montht is a set of 
month dummy variables used to account for seasonal variation. Routei is a set of 
dummies to capture meter route fixed effect. 
Estimation of Equation 5 generates a demand curve for each block rate group. 
The implicit assumption is that customer’s average summer consumption in the year 
prior to the price change represents their inherent consumption pattern. We then follow 
these customers after the price change.  
 We make several important data restrictions. First, observations are limited to 
the months corresponding to the price change (May for the 2006 price change and 
March for the 2015 price change) through September. This limits the sample to summer 
months, which are the most important months for supplying water, while containing the 
months immediately following the price change. It also includes observations of 
consumption behavior in the months immediately following the price change. Second, 
we omit observations with consumption amounts less than 100 gallons. This eliminates 
negative consumption amounts, which stem from misreading meters or billing errors as 
well as houses that are vacant for large parts of the month. Third, we drop houses that 




than 10 years old in 2002 and no more than 23 years old by the end of our sample. This 
helps to mitigate concerns about unobserved changes in household features 
(remodeling, renovation) during our sampling period since the housing features 
variables are only available for 2014. Thus, the analysis is limited to newer houses 
which are less likely to be significantly modified. The final samples include 6,011 
customers for the 2006 change and 7,969 customers for the 2015 change. 
 
Estimation Results  
The main results are presented in Tables 18 and 19 corresponding to the 2006 
and 2015 price changes, respectively. Each set of columns corresponds to a different 
customer group based on the average summer consumption in the summer prior to the 
price change as explained above.  The coefficients on the price change variables 
represent the responses to the water rate increase in the post rate change period holding 
other factors constant.  
For the 2006 price change, the estimated coefficients for price change variables 
are negative for the second, third and fourth rate groups and positive for the first group. 
The impacts are statistically significant for the first, second, and third groups. The 
second group is predicted to reduce consumption by 10.3% after the price increase. The 
third group reduced its consumption by an estimated 13% in response to the price 
increase. The fourth Group, those users who consume more than 20,000 gallons in a 
month, decreased their consumption by an estimated 6.7% in response to the rate 
increase. The failure to find an impact statistically different from zero for the last group, 














The first group, the smallest volume users, had the largest predicted response to 
the price change among the groups. The results suggest that customers in this group 
increased their consumption by 15.2% in response to the rate increase. This is counter to 
demand theory for normal goods.
48
 It is, however, consistent with the boomerang effect 
found in some research on conservation (Delmas and Lessem, 2014).  As discussed 
above, rate increases in the City of Norman require a local election. Such elections 
involve a tremendous amount of public education about the nature of the change as well 
as impacts on customers across the distribution. Accordingly, it is possible that the low 
consumption group became aware of their relatively small use relative to the average or 
median customers.  This could have encouraged more consumption rather than less. As 
discussed below, the estimated response was in the opposite direction for this group 
after the 2015 price change. 
As shown in Table 19, every group was predicted to decrease consumption in 
response to the 2015 rate increases.  All the estimated price change coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level. The first block rate group responded to the 2006 rate 
increase by increasing consumption, but responded to the 2015 change by reducing 
consumption. The estimated negative predicted responses correspond to negatively 
sloped demand curves. The estimated responses were increasing from group one, which 
had an estimated 6.5 % reduction in water consumption, to group four, which had an 
estimated 16.6 % reduction.  
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 A price increase could lead to more consumption in the case of a Giffen good.  Water, however, is 




Notably, the literature has little to say about price responsiveness of high tier 
users compared with lower tier users. The literature universally estimates a single 
demand curve for entire city or region which prevents such a comparison. Our results 
suggest that highest tier users were more responsive to the 2015 rate changes compared 
with lower tier users. For the 2006 rate changes, however, the highest tier reduced 
consumption less than lower tiers and the estimated impact was not found to be 
statistically significant.  We explore this further by calculating elasticities below. 
 
Other Explanatory Variables 
The control variables reveal interesting trends by group. Rainfall and lagged 
rainfall take on the expected sign (negative) and all lagged rainfall coefficients are 
significant whereas the concurrent rainfall coefficients are only significant for the larger 
groups. The coefficients imply that another centimeter of rainfall in the previous month 
leads to a 1.1% decrease in consumption for the smallest group and a 2.7% decrease for 
the largest group. In general for both the 2006 and the 2015 specifications the higher the 
consumption group the larger the response to lagged rainfall. This is also true for 
concurrent rainfall in 2006 as the two lower block rate groups are unresponsive to 
current rainfall but the two larger groups respond with a roughly 0.5% decrease. 
Interestingly, the response to current rainfall in 2015 is a uniform 0.3% decrease. 
Estimated coefficients for Standard deviation of rainfall and lagged standard deviation 
are mostly statistically significant but economically insignificant. The variability of 




The estimated coefficients for housing characteristics also reveal that the groups 
behave differently. The market value of the house increases consumption in the all 
groups in both specifications. For each 1,000 dollar increase in a home’s value we see a 
1/10 of percent increase in consumption. The implication being a $50,000 increase in a 
home’s value would correspond to a 5% increase in consumption. The estimated 
coefficients on a home’s age were also as expected with exception of the low tier users 
in 2006: the newer the house, the less the predicted consumption, holding other factors 
constant. For the higher tier groups, age has the biggest predicted impact on 
consumption. The number of bathrooms increases predicted consumption by about 5% 
per bathroom. The number of baths has a significant impact except for group two in the 
2006 estimates.  
Lot features are also salient. The estimated pool area coefficients are positive 
and significant in all cases. Except for the smallest group in the 2006 results, the 
estimated coefficients imply a 1 or 2 tenths of percent increase in consumption for every 
10 square feet of surface area of pool. The estimated coefficients on pervious surface 
are positive and significant in all cases except group two and group four in the 2006 
specifications. In general, the amount of pervious surface area in a lot appears to 
increase water consumption by a few tenths of a percent per thousands of square foot. 
 
Price Elasticity of Water Demand Estimates 
Water utility managers are greatly interested in revenue implications of water 
rate changes which depend on consumption responses across rate block groups.  If the 




reactions to rate increases could reduce utility revenues at the same time it encourages 
consumption. The elasticity of water demand across income groups is ambiguous in 
theory. Since higher tier groups face higher prices, it is possible that customers in this 
group are more responsive to price changes compared with users in lower tiers. On the 
other hand, since higher tier customers are likely to be wealthier, water costs may be 
only a small share of income leading to little responsiveness to water rates. This is the 
conventional view (Mansur and Olmstead, 2007).  
To evaluate the price responses from a revenue perspective, we estimate basic 
price elasticities which include the price changes for each block group. Table 20  
presents basic elasticity calculations for each group for the two rate changes. We 
calculate the elasticity using the midpoint formula by using the estimated change in 
consumption (estimated B1 coefficients) and the amount of the price change.  
Our findings suggest that higher demand users are relatively more responsive to 
rate increases than lower demand users. In 2006 we see a price elasticity of 0.46 for the 
lowest users, the only positive elasticity among the groups in either price change. The 
second group has a price elasticity of -0.17. The third group has a price elasticity 
of -0.41, which is the largest negative elasticity of the 2006 groups. The fourth group 






Table 20: Price Elasticity of Water Demand Estimation 
2006 Rate Change   




Percentage Change in 
Price  
Elasticity 
0.152 $0.57 0.33 0.46 
-0.103 $0.96 0.59 -0.17 
-0.13 $0.75 0.32 -0.41 
-0.067 $0.95 0.21 -0.32 
    
2015 Rate Change   




Percentage Change in 
Price  
Elasticity 
-0.065 $1.35 0.50 -0.13 
-0.094 $2.00 0.65 -0.15 
-0.113 $2.45 0.62 -0.18 
-0.166 $1.85 0.31 -0.53 
    *The 1999 prices were not uniform below 5,000 gallons. The first 1,000 gallons were $2.01, the next 
1,000 gallons were $1.75, and the 3,000-5,000 gallons were $1.14 per 1,000 gallons. We use a weighted 
average price for the pre change price. ($2.01+$1.73+3*$1.14)/5=$1.43 
 Calculated as (new price - old price) / ((new price + old price)/2) 
 
In 2015 we find negative elasticities for all groups, with increasing price 
sensitivity as consumption increases. The smallest tier users respond the least to the 
price change with a -0.13 elasticity which switched direction as discussed above. The 
second group had a price elastic a little higher (-0.15) and similar to that from the 2006 
rate change (-0.17). The third group had a much smaller elasticity in the 2015 estimates 
than it did in the 2006 estimates, dropping from -0.41 to -0.18. The largest group had 
two of the biggest price elasticities, including the largest of all groups across both 
specifications (-0.53 in 2015). 
 Whereas we do find results suggesting that higher demand users respond more 




less than one (inelastic). The revenue implication is that rate block price increases 
swamped consumption decreases, thus potentially enhancing utility revenues.  
 As a robustness check we relax the year built restriction and find similar results. 
We still estimate a positive coefficient associated with the price change variable for the 
first group in 2006. The coefficient is still significant at the1% level although its 
magnitude is somewhat smaller compared with estimates using the year built restriction. 
The coefficients on the price change for the fourth group in the 2006 regression is still 
negative but is now significant. (Table 21). The coefficients on the controls are largely 
the same. All four of the price change coefficients in the 2015 price change regressions 
are negative and significant as before. (Table 22). 
A second robustness check adds a dummy variable that accounts for times when 
the city of Norman implemented mandatory watering restrictions. We set the dummy 
variable equal to one for months when the mandatory watering restrictions are in place. 
The regressions are presented in Table 23, which presents the baseline 2015 
specification with the dummy variable, and Table 24, which presents the 2015 
specification with the year built restriction removed and the dummy variable added. We 
find that the main variables of interest are unchanged. The mandatory watering 
coefficient for the lowest group in the 2006 estimates remains positive and significant. 
The rest of the mandatory watering restrictions are negative and significant at the one 
























Table 24: Water Consumption Estimates for 2015 Rate Change: Mandatory Water 






In a world of increasing water scarcity, there is a pressing need to better 
understand water demand behavior and the role of pricing strategies for water utility 
management.  Due to data limitations and inappropriate empirical strategies, the 
literature provides little guidance, and in some cases misleading conclusions, about 
water demand behavior. Using comprehensive data with a large number of water utility 
customers and fourteen years of water consumption data encompassing two rate 
increases, we address the major the shortcomings in the literature.  
A major issue is how to estimate demand behavior when prices are determined 
using a block rate structure. Simply regressing consumption and charges (as some do) 
results in what appears to be an upward sloping demand curve (but what is actually a 
supply curve). Including multiple municipalities with different rate structures introduces 
other issues (and still has the block rate problem). Instead of estimate a single demand 
curve for a municipality, we estimate responses to rate increases for different groups of 
users based on where they are located in the block rate structure. We apply our 
approach for the 2006 and 2015 rate changes in the City of Norman, Oklahoma.  We 
uncover negatively sloped demand curves and substantial heterogeneity in 
responsiveness to rate changes.  
To our knowledge, we are the first to explore the heterogeneity of water demand 
response to rate changes by estimating demand curves for individual block groups. 
Dissecting the demand curve in this manner is useful for understanding revenue and 
supply implications for water utility managers. In our analysis of the City of Norman, 




inelastic).  Our results, however, may not generalize for other cities given Norman’s 
unique election requirements for water utility rate changes. Furthermore, we estimate 
demand for only single family residents in Norman. 
There are many potential extensions to our research.  For instance, it would be 
interesting to expand our sample to include older homes.  Do customers in older homes 
respond differently than those in newer ones? Instead of limiting our sample to homes 
in census tracts with weather sensors, we could map a home to its nearest sensor. This 
would give us more complete coverage of the city and increase our sample size and 
allow us to investigate robustness of our results to the precision of weather data.  How 
much precision is needed for water demand studies? 
The timing of response to water rate changes is another potential extension.  Do 
customers respond to rate changes immediately or does it take several months to modify 
behavior? Is there a persistent price change effect? A related investigation would 
narrowly focus on customers near rate block discontinuities.  How different is price 
responsiveness for these marginal customers?  Finally, we could investigate aspects of 
long run and short run demand. This could be done by reducing the years included in 
the sample to find a short run impact.   
No matter the particular research question, researchers need to seek out more 
comprehensive data on customer usage. Fortunately, customer billing data combined 
with GIS capabilities make this increasingly feasible. We encourage other scholars to 
replicate our analysis using data from other cities.  This will add to our global 
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Appendix A: Experiment Documents 
Sample Flyer  
Month Day, 2015 
Dear Norman Resident, 
As you are aware, the City of Norman as well as the rest of the State of Oklahoma has 
suffered drought conditions over the past few years.  The City’s main source of drinking 
water is Lake Thunderbird which is shared with Del City and Midwest City and is 
managed by the Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy District (COMCD). Norman 
has exceeded its allotment of water from Lake Thunderbird, 15 times since 1988 due to 
population growth and insufficient rainfall.   
Even with adequate rainfall, the City faces limits on its infrastructure capacity, and high 
demand on summer days causes the City to have to purchase water from Oklahoma 
City.  The City has adopted mandatory conservation policies such as even-odd watering 
days throughout the year, and a drought contingency plan to encourage conservation 
when needed.   
The City of Norman, in conjunction with the COMCD, is working on several plans to 
address Norman’s current and future water scarcity issues and all of them are expensive.  
Building new wells, expanding water treatment plant capacity, and purchasing water 
from Oklahoma City on an emergency basis place significant fiscal burdens on the City 
budget. To address infrastructure needs, voters in the City of Norman approved 
increased water rates this year. 
Addressing water scarcity is everyone’s responsibility. Summer is the most critical time 
for conservation. 
Reducing your consumption will save you money and help the City to manage scarce 
water resources. Included in this envelope is a list of ways you can reduce your water 
use. Use these tips to reduce your household’s use and preserve the city’s priceless 





Sample Tip Sheet  
 
 How you can help conserve  
Norman’s water  
Outdoor  
 Water the lawn and garden in the early morning or at night when the sun won’t cause as much 
evaporation. Avoid sprinklers with fine mists, they increase evaporation.  
 
 Keep grass two to three inches long to enhance root development with minimal watering.  
 
 Use drought-tolerant plants. Ask your local nursery about plants and trees appropriate for 
Oklahoma. 
 
 Wash your car with a bucket and sponge rather than with a running hose. This cuts usage by as 
much as 90 gallons.  
 
 Pay careful attention to sprinklers to prevent watering driveways, streets and sidewalks.  
 
 Water your lawn with only one inch of water every seven to ten days. (Less often if there has 
been recent rain.) Overwatered lawns and plants grow shallower roots and are more likely to die 
during droughts. 
 
 Use mulch in gardens to minimize weed growth, slow erosion, and diminish evaporation.  
 
 Check for leaks in pipes, hoses, faucets, couplings, and lawn sprinkler systems. Repair any 
problems immediately! One broken sprinkler can use an additional 100 gallons in a typical 10 
minute watering cycle.  
 
 Use a low flow nozzle on your hose. Using a standard nozzle on your hose to wash your car or 
water your plants can require hundreds of gallons more than a low flow nozzle.  
 
 Avoid using a hose to clean your driveway or sidewalk. Use a broom to save hundreds of gallons 
of water. 
Indoor  
 Install low flow showerheads. They are easy to install and save both water and energy.  
 
 Install low flow toilets or install a toilet tank displacement insert or dam to reduce the volume of 
water used per flush. Placing a plastic jug filled with water in the tank is an effective 
displacement device.  
 
 Check for leaks inside toilets. Leaks can waste up to 200 gallons of water a day. Toilet leaks can 
be detected by adding a few drops of food coloring to water in the toilet tank. If the colored 
water appears in the bowl, the toilet is leaking.  
 
 Never use the toilet as a wastebasket.  
 
 Operate the dishwasher and washing machines only when completely full.  
 





Sample Peer Comparison  
Month Day, 2015 
Dear Norman Resident, 
As you are aware, the City of Norman as well as the rest of the State of Oklahoma has 
suffered drought conditions over the past few years.  The City’s main source of drinking 
water is Lake Thunderbird which is shared by Del City, Midwest City and is managed 
by the Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy District (COMCD). Norman has 
exceeded its allotment of water from Lake Thunderbird, 15 times since 1988 due to 
population growth and insufficient rainfall.   
Even with adequate rainfall, the City’s ability to provide clean drinking water is limited 
by infrastructure capacity.  On high demand summer days when water capacity is 
insufficient, the City imposes mandatory conservation policies such as even-odd 
watering days, and days when no outside watering is allowed.  
The City of Norman, in conjunction with the COMCD, is working on several plans to 
address Norman’s current and future water scarcity issues and all of them are expensive.  
Building new wells, expanding water treatment plant capacity, and purchasing water 
from Oklahoma city on an emergency basis place significant fiscal burdens on the City 
budget. To address funding needs, the City of Norman increased water rates this year. 
Addressing water scarcity is everyone’s responsibility. Summer is the most critical time 
for conservation. 
[INSERT FOR FULL TREATMENT GROUP] 
For the months June through September of last year, 
Your total consumption was:       X gallons 
Your water-conscious neighbor’s total consumption was:  X gallons 
You used X% more than your most water-conscious neighbors.* 
*water-conscious neighbors use less than 80% of neighbors in same water 
meter route. 
[END INSERT] 
Reducing your consumption could save you money and help the City to avoid water 
scarcity. Included in this envelope is a list of ways you can reduce your water use. Use 





Appendix B: Details and Tests Regarding Misreporting 
Misreporting impacted only the peer treatment groups.  Two components of the 
peer comparison letter were influenced: the amount of water used by the customer in the 
previous year, and the difference between the customer’s use and the water conscious 
neighbor which is expressed in percentage terms.  The concern is that the errors in the 
reported messages are systematically related to the estimated treatment impacts. This 
appendix presents evidence to mitigate these concerns.   
The usage reported to the customers was incorrectly calculated based on the 
billing amount rather than the usage amount in the utility billing records.  Because of 
the graduated rate structure, the billing amounts are related to the usage, but not in a 
strictly linear fashion.  The error would greatly depend on the usage and the 
discontinuities in the rate structure (the breaks). Given the randomization of the treated 
groups, we don’t expect the inflation of reported usage to be important.  Results in 
Table 25 confirm this.  Table 25 provides estimates of water consumption for a variety 
of specifications.  The estimated coefficients on the percent reported usage error are 
very small and statistically insignificant in all the specifications.   
Next we consider the impact of the misreporting on the peer messages.  As 
discussed in the text, both the calculation of the individual customer usage and that of 
the water conscious neighbor (the comparison anchor) were affected.  However, the 
relative usage ranks were not impacted. Recall that the peer messages reported relative 
differences as a percent: “you used X% above/below the water conscious neighbor.” 
The reported peer comparisons could have been larger or smaller than the actual 




many of the calculation errors did not result in reporting errors on the peer messages.  
Figures 16 and 17 show scatter plots of the misreported peer comparisons (difference 
between the percent reported and the actual percent) plotted against customer’s 
consumption for the observations which receive the peer message. For most of the sub-
sample the difference is small and the average size of the misreported peer comparison 
is only three tenths of a percentage. Notably, the highest misreport of percentage use 
was for a customer who consumed over 300,000 gallons in July of 2014. The next 
highest misreport was less than 10% different from the correct percent. There does 
appear to be a systematic increase in misreporting at larger levels of consumption. The 
estimates in Table 26 confirm that the peer comparisons were systematically over 
reported for customers who used more water.  The estimates indicate that on average 
each 1% of misreported peer comparison is associated with from 310 to 390 extra 
gallons consumed per month. This raises concerns that that the estimated peer treatment 
impacts are biased. 
To investigate whether the misreporting impacted estimates of treatment 
impacts, we add variables which measure the misreporting to the benchmark model 
corresponding to Equation 5 which uses incremental treatment variables. The results 
shown in Table 27 suggest that the misreporting likely had little impact on the peer 
treatment.  The estimated coefficient for misreported consumption variable is small and 
statistically insignificant.  The coefficient on misreported peer comparison variable is 
also insignificant, but not of negligible size.  Notably, the estimated peer comparison 
treatment impact is robust across the specifications. The impact of the tip sheet message 




treatment, however, become smaller and fail to achieve significance. This is 
unexpected. 
Table 28 presents a similar set of estimates using the exclusive treatment 
variables. We find that the estimated coefficients associated with the misreported 
variables are again insignificant.  Once again the estimated coefficient on the 
conservation message only variable falls in size and become insignificant when the 
misreported peer comparison variable is included.  The effect of the tip sheet remains 
insignificant. Notably, the estimated coefficients for the peer comparison treatment 
variables (CM_PEER and CM_PEER_TIP) are robust and increase in size.   
Taken as a whole these estimates ease concerns that the reporting errors 
























  Coefficient/SE Coefficient/SE Coefficient/SE 
Peer Comparison -4.418*** 1.257 -4.313*** 1.364 -4.491*** 1.320 
Conservation Message -2.393* 1.235 -2.389* 1.236 -1.520 1.299 




  Misreported Peer 
Comparison      
-1.129 4.630 
Constant  87.106*** 0.239 87.106*** 0.239 79.116*** 0.251 
Household FE x 
 
x  x  
Month FE x 
 
x  x  
Year FE 




Months Covered Apr-Sept 
 
Apr-Sept  Apr-Sept  
Years Covered 2014-2015 
 
2014-2015  2014-2015  
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




















Figure 16: Scatter Plot of Misreported Peer Comparison (Reported percent minus 
actual percent) 
 
 
 
 
 
